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Sudhir Yadav v. State of Bihar and Another

2. The impugned order set aside the entire prosecution in a case charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 as also Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959.

(J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.)

Sudhir Yadav ___________________________________ Appellant;

v.

State of Bihar and Another _______________________ Respondent(s).

Criminal Appeal No. of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 13858 of 2026)§, decided on August 12, 2026

The Order of the court was delivered by

Order

Leave granted.

2. The impugned order set aside the entire prosecution in a case charged under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 307 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 as also Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959.

3. We heard learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents.

4. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 appears for the first time and prayed for time to produce some documents. However, in the nature of the impugned order, we were not inclined to grant time.

5. The High Court looked at two aspects to quash the proceedings, the FIR and the injury report. In the FIR, it was alleged that the de-facto complainant, who also gave the first information statement alleged that at a particular location, the assailants together caught him and in the course of an assault; graphically described, one of the assailants exhorted to shoot the victim in his private parts and one another assailant fired at him pointing towards his private parts, which hit him in his left rib-cage. The High Court found, on a mere reading of the FIR, that the graphic detailing of the incident indicates that the de-facto complainant wanted to spread a very wide net so as to implicate many and that it reads more like a script, which makes it wholly unbelievable. The High Court also took note of the injuries caused, which was in the left flank of the abdomen, which was not indicated as caused by a firearm in the injury report. Looking at the injury caused, it cannot be said that there was a point-blank firing aimed at the groin, presumed the High Court.

6. We are afraid that the High Court completely went overboard and on mere assumptions and presumptions, put an end to the prosecution proceedings.

7. The High Court had also noticed two decisions from which extracts were made. State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy2 was a case in which there was an alleged conspiracy and on a reading of the statements recorded by the police, the Court had come to the conclusion that the statements disclosed only frequent meetings between the accused, after the dismissal of the first accused and prior to the assault alleged to have resulted from a conspiracy. Salib @ Shalu @ Salim v. State of Uttar Pradesh3, cautioned the Courts from looking into the FIR/complaint alone; in a totally different context. There, it was observed that if the complaint is made with an ulterior motive of wreaking personal vengeance, then the complaint would be well drafted with the necessary pleadings and the ingredients of the offence emanating from such pleadings. The warning sounded was that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 19734, the Court is not restricted to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation or registration of the case.

8. We find the dictum coming out from the above cases not to be applicable in the present case. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal5 was noticed but not discussed, which is the locus classicus on how a proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC is to be dealt with; the guidelines in which, has been given a complete go-by in the impugned judgment.

9. Admittedly, there was an injury as seen from the injury report. The mere fact that the allegation was of aiming at the groin, but the injury was caused on the left flank of the abdomen cannot be projected as a falsity in itself. Section 149 of the IPC was included and 7 persons were alleged to have participated in the assault of one person. In such a scramble, it is probable that the shot fired did not injure the person in the part of the body at which it was aimed. The assumption of the injury not being a fire arm injury, is one made based on a mere look at the injury report; which according to us is grossly premature. Reading Salib @ Shalu @ Salim3, we have to observe that there cannot be a corollary drawn that every well drafted complaint would be a falsity in itself.

10. We are unable to sustain the order passed especially noticing the provisions under which the offence has been charged. We are also convinced that the injury having been caused, the circumstances under which it was caused, the exact nature of the wound, are all matters of evidence, which has to be proved and established in a properly constituted trial. Even if there was no injury caused and the person who shot it points a finger at the accused; who aimed at his chest and missed totally, Section 307 could definitely be charged, if there are other attendant circumstances, like the cartridge being recovered from the location, the recovery of the weapon being made under Section 27 and forensic evidence matching the cartridge seized with weapon recovered.

11. We hence set aside the impugned order and direct the investigation to be proceeded with. The accused shall appear before the Magistrate’s Court and with notice to the police, bail shall be considered, after hearing the police and deciding as to whether the police; if seeking custody, is justified in making such a request. The accused shall appear before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate IX, Gaya within a period of two weeks from the date of this order. Magadh University Police Station Case No. 106 of 2018 registered before that Court shall stand revived. If there is no appearance as directed herein, the police would be entitled to arrest the accused.

12. The appeal shall stand allowed.

13. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

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1 For brevity, ‘the IPC’

2 (1977) 2 SCC 699

3 (2023) 20 SCC 194

4 For brevity, ‘the Cr.P.C’

5 AIR 1992 SC 604

§ 2026 INSC 861