(V. Ramasubramanian and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.)
Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Others _________________________________________ Appellant(s);
v.
Venkatesh Murthy and Another ___________________ Respondent(s).
Civil Appeal No. 2989 of 2011, decided on February 15, 2023
The Order of the court was delivered by
Order
1. This appeal arises out of an order passed by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court dismissing the writ appeal filed by the appellant herein and confirming an order of the learned Single Judge in a writ petition filed by the respondents-workmen.
2. We have heard Mr. Narendra Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Rahul Jain, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1-workman.
3. The respondent nos. 1 and 2 were originally appointed as conductors respectively in the years 1976 and 1981. On account of an injury suffered in a road traffic accident, which happened in the year 1982, while respondent no. 1 was on duty, he was hospitalized for more than a year and he resumed duty in a lighter work allotted by the management pursuant to a settlement, which was in place between the management and the workers union.
4. In the year 1993, both the respondents were relieved from the light duty work and they were directed to report for duty as conductors. When such an order was challenged in a writ petition, the learned Single Judge of the High Court directed the respondents to be subjected to medical examination.
5. In the medical examination conducted in the year 1995, the respondents were found not fit to work as conductors, but entitled to be allotted alternative work. Accepting the medical report, the management of the appellant corporation allowed both the respondents to work as booking clerks.
6. After a year or so of said allotment of light work, the management again passed an order on 12.03.1998, stating that there is no provision for allotment of alternative duty and that the respondents should work only as conductors.
7. The order of the management dated 12.03.1998 was challenged by the respondents in two different writ petitions. The learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed both the writ petitions and the Division Bench of the High Court confirmed the dismissal of the same by an order dated 25.02.1999.
8. The said order of the Division Bench was challenged only by respondent no. 1 in a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 10678/2000, which was converted to Civil Appeal No. 2782/2001. It was allowed by this Court remanding the matter back to the Division Bench for a fresh disposal. It is relevant here to note that the order of remand was in respect of the writ appeal no. 4540/1998, which had been filed by respondent no. 1 alone against the order of the learned Single Judge.
9. After the said remand, the Division Bench of the High Court some how took both the writ appeals and passed another order of remand sending the matter back to the learned Single Judge. Thus, respondent no. 2 gained a fresh lease of life.
10. By an order dated 13.12.2002, the learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed both the writ petitions of the respondents and the same was confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court by the order impugned in this civil appeal.
11. The narration of facts given above would show that both the respondents were allotted light duty work on medical conditions in the years 1984 and 1987 respectively. But, all of a sudden a relieving order was passed on 06.09.1993, directing the respondents to report to work as conductors.
12. The said order was successfully challenged by the respondents in a writ petition, in and by the order passed in which, the respondents were referred to a medical board. On the basis of the medical opinion, the respondents were restored to duty as booking clerks for doing “desk work”.
13. But again, the management passed a fresh order on 12.03.1998 directing the respondents to go back as conductors. This order was completely wrong.
14. However, the fact remains that respondent no. 1 was dismissed from service pursuant to disciplinary proceedings, by an order dated 02.09.1999 and the industrial dispute raised by the respondent no. 1 in relation to this dismissal, was rejected. The award of the Labour Court refusing to interfere with the penalty of dismissal from service, has attained finality insofar as respondent no. 1 is concerned. But by a strange logic, the High Court, by the impugned order interfered with the same, though there was no challenge to it.
15. Insofar as respondent no. 2 is concerned, his challenge to the fresh order dated 12.03.1998, directing him to report for duty as conductor stood rejected by the order passed in the writ appeal on 25.02.1999. Respondent no. 2 did not lay a challenge to the said order.
16. Therefore, the fact remains that beyond 02.09.1999 in the case of respondent no. 1 and beyond 25.02.1999 in the case of respondent no. 2, no relief could have been granted by the High Court. It appears that the respondent no. 1 had reached the age of superannuation on 31.08.2015 and respondent no. 2 had reached the age of superannuation on 31.08.2014. Thus, there are two periods of time in the career of the respondents, which have become little complicated. The first period of time is from 1993 to 1999, when they were successfully adjudicating their rights to be allotted light duty. The second is the period from 1999 till 2014/2015, when they reached superannuation.
17. The management is also at fault in not taking any action against respondent no. 2 after 25.02.1999 till the date he reached the age of superannuation. This is despite the fact that the management passed an order of penalty in respect of respondent no. 1.
18. Therefore, the High Court at the most should have granted partial relief to both the respondents. Even upto the period that they were lawfully entitled to relief, namely, the year 1999, the respondents had completed about 18-23 years of service. Therefore, instead of making matters more complex, at this distance of time and taking in account the fact that both the respondents have reached superannuation, we exercise our power conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and pass the following order substituting the impugned order of the High Court:
“The respondents shall be treated as having retired from service in September and February, 1999, respectively. The appellant-management shall pay the full pay and allowances that the respondents would be entitled to upto the period, i.e., 30.09.1999 in the case of respondent no. 1 and 28.02.1999 in the case of respondent no. 2. All the terminal benefits shall be calculated as on these two dates of retirement and shall be paid to the respondents within a period of three months after adjusting whatever payments already made”.
19. With the above modifications, the civil appeal is disposed of.
20. Pending application (s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
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