(Ranjan Gogoi, Arun Mishra and Prafulla C. Pant, JJ.)
Canara Bank _______________________________________ Appellant
v.
D.R.P. Sundharam _________________________________ Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 352 of 2016, decided on January 18, 2016
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 17338/2008]
The Order of the court was delivered by
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. The respondent – writ petitioner while serving as Assistant General Manager of the Canara Bank superannuated on 31st May, 2007. After his retirement, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him by a charge-memo dated 28th June, 2007. Prior to the above, he was placed under suspension on 23rd November, 2006 and as it appears from the materials on record there were correspondences exchanged by and between the Authorities of the Bank with regard to the initiation of a disciplinary proceeding against the respondent-writ petitioner. However, nothing appears to have come out of the said exercise and the respondent – writ petitioner superannuated, as noticed above, whereafter a charge-sheet was served upon him. Aggrieved by the departmental proceeding initiated, the respondent – writ petitioner moved the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned single judge hearing the writ petition allowed the same and quashed the proceedings initiated against the respondent – writ petitioner. The said order was affirmed in the Writ Appeal filed by the Bank. Aggrieved, the present appeal in question has been lodged before this Court by the Bank upon grant of leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
3. The High Court while deciding the matter appears to have relied upon two judgments of this Court in UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [(2007) 6 SCC 694] and in UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [(2008) 5 SCC 257]. The Bench hearing the petition for leave to appeal upon due consideration seems to have doubted the correctness of the views expressed in the said decisions of the coordinate Bench and accordingly by order dated 4th August, 2010 made a reference to a larger Bench. It is pursuant thereto that the mater has been placed before us for consideration.
4. The relevant regulations which would govern the controversy that has arisen in the present case are Regulations 20(3)(i), 20(3)(ii) and 20(3)(iii) of Canara Bank (Officers’) Service Regulations, 1979, which may be extracted herein below:
“20. Termination of service
(1) .. ….
… .. ….
(3)(i) An Officer against whom disciplinary proceedings are pending shall not leave/discontinue or resign from his service in the bank without the prior approval in writing of Competent Authority and any notice or resignation given by such an Officer before or during the disciplinary proceedings shall not take effect unless it is accepted by the Competent Authority.
(ii) Disciplinary proceedings shall be deemed to be pending against any employee for the purpose of this Regulation if he has been placed under suspension or any notice has been issued to him to show-cause why disciplinary proceedings shall not be instituted against him and will be deemed to be pending until final orders are passed by the Competent Authority.
(iii) The Officer against whom disciplinary proceedings have been initiated will cease to be in service on the date of superannuation but the disciplinary proceedings will continue as if he was in service until the proceedings are concluded and final order is passed in respect there of. The concerned Officer will not receive any pay and/or allowance after the date of superannuation. He will also not be entitled for payments of retirement benefits till the proceedings are completed and final order is passed thereon except his own contribution to CPF.”
5. A reading of the Regulations would go to show that Regulation 20(3)(i) deals with serving bank employees who during the pendency of a departmental proceeding may seek to retire or resign from service. Such a course is prohibited except with the approval of the Bank. Regulation 20(3)(ii) clarifies that a disciplinary proceeding would be deemed to be pending where a notice has been issued to show cause why disciplinary proceedings shall not be instituted or the officer has been placed under suspension. Regulation 20(3)(iii) contemplates that an officer against whom a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated may superannuate but he will be deemed to have continued in service until the proceedings are concluded. It is the meaning and effect of Regulation 20(3)(iii) which would require an authoritative pronouncement from this Court in terms of the reference made.
6. The neat and short question that is required to answer is: whether Regulation 20(3)(iii) is in continuation of Regulations 20(3)(i) and 20(3)(ii) or whether it contemplates a situation different from what has been contemplated under Regulations 20(3)(i) and 20(3)(ii).
7. We have read and considered the views expressed in UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [(2007) 6 SCC 694] and in UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [(2008) 5 SCC 257]. The matter has been exhaustively dealt with in paragraph 14 to 23 of the judgment in UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [(2008) 5 SCC 257]. The meaning of the expression “this Regulation” appearing in Regulation 20(3)(ii) on which much stress has been laid at the hearing by the learned counsel for the appellant; the use of different expressions/terminologies in Regulation 20(3)(ii) and Regulation 20(3)(iii), namely, “proceeding pending” and “proceeding initiated”; the content effect and purport of UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 have all been considered to arrive at the conclusion that Regulation 20(3)(iii) is a stand-alone provision and what is contemplated thereunder is not in continuation of what is provided for and contemplated by the two earlier Regulations i.e. Regulation 20(3)(i) and Regulation 20(3)(ii). Paragraphs 14 to 23 of the said judgment in UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [(2008) 5 SCC 257] may be usefully set out herein below:
“14. Sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 20 of the 1979 Regulations places an embargo on an official to leave or discontinue his service of the bank without giving a notice in writing. It prescribes a period of notice.
15. Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20, however, places an embargo on an officer to leave or discontinue or resign from service without the prior approval in writing of the competent authority and a notice or resignation given by such an officer before or during the disciplinary proceedings shall not take effect unless it is accepted by the competent authority. Clause (ii) of Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 must be considered from that aspect of the matter. It raises a legal fiction. Such legal fiction has been raised only for the purpose of “this Regulation” and for no other, which would mean Regulation 20(1). The final orders which are required to be passed by the competent authority although indisputably would be in relation to the disciplinary proceedings but evidently it is for the purpose of accepting resignation or leaving or discontinuing of the service by the employee concerned or grant of approval thereof. Clause (ii) of Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 in effect and substance acts as a proviso to Clause (i) thereof.
16. Clause (iii) of Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 is an independent provision. It provides for continuation of the disciplinary proceedings. Such disciplinary proceedings indisputably for the purpose of applicability of Sub-regulation (3) must have been initiated in terms of the 1976 Regulations.
17. It is worth noticing the distinction between terminologies “proceeding pending” or “proceeding initiated”. Clause (ii) of Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 defines what would be pending, viz., for the purpose of attracting Clause (i) thereof.
18. A disciplinary proceeding is initiated in terms of the 1976 Regulations, which are applicable only in a case where a proceeding is initiated for the purpose of taking disciplinary action against a delinquent officer for the purpose of imposing a punishment on him. Disciplinary proceedings, thus, are initiated only in terms of the 1976 Regulations and not in terms of the 1979 Regulations.
19. It is worth noticing that the 1979 Regulations would be attracted when no disciplinary proceeding is possible to be initiated. The 1976 Regulations, however, on the other hand, would be attracted when a disciplinary proceeding is initiated. Both operate in separate fields. We do not see any nexus between Regulations 20(1) and 20(2) of the 1979 Regulations and the 1976 Regulations.
20. The 1976 Regulations provide for the mode and manner in which a disciplinary proceeding is initiated. It expressly provides for service of charge sheet. Service of charge sheet is a necessary ingredient for initiation of disciplinary proceeding. A preliminary enquiry is not contemplated under the 1976 Regulations. If such an enquiry is held, the same is only for the purpose of arriving at a satisfaction on the part of the disciplinary authority to initiate a proceeding and not for any other purpose.
21. If it is found that a disciplinary proceeding can be and should be initiated, recourse to the 1976 Regulations would have to be taken, if not, the 1979 Regulations may be resorted to if the conditions precedent therefor are satisfied. It is only with a view to put an embargo on the officer to leave his job, Clause (ii) of Sub-Regulation (3) of Regulation 20 of the 1979 Regulations has been made. It’s scope is limited.
22. We have noticed hereinbefore that each regulations operates in different fields. When a proceeding is initiated for the purpose of taking any disciplinary action on the ground of any misconduct which might have been committed by the officer concerned indisputably the procedures laid down in the 1976 Regulations are required to be resorted to.
23. The 1979 Regulations would be attracted only for the purpose of termination of service. Had the intention of the regulation making authority been that the legal fiction created under Clause (ii) of sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 would cover both Clauses (i) and (iii), the same should have been placed only after Clause (iii). In such an event, Clause (ii) of Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 20 should have been differently worded. Some non obstante clause would have been provided for making an exception to the applicability of the 1976 Regulations when a legal fiction is created, although it is required to be taken to the logical conclusion [See East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, [(1951) 2 All.E.R 587], but the same would not mean that the effect thereof would be extended so as to transgress the scope and purport for which it is created.”
8. On an exhaustive consideration of the manner in which the provisions have been analyzed and the clear and unambiguous language of the same and also having regard to the provisions of the 1976 Regulations of the Bank with regard to initiation of disciplinary proceeding we have no doubt in our mind that the meaning given to the provisions of the Regulations in the said case is correct and does not require any reconsideration. From the above it would follow that by virtue of the provisions contained in Regulation 20(3)(iii), a disciplinary proceeding initiated by means of a charge-sheet prior to the retirement of a bank employee would continue even after his retirement in view of the deeming provision contained in the said Regulation 20(3)(iii) by which the officer is deemed to continue in service till completion of the proceedings.
9. In the present case, the proceedings have been initiated by submission of the charge-sheet after the retirement of the respondent. Having regard to the fact that the Regulations in force in Canara Bank are pari materia with those in the UCO Bank considered in the aforesaid decision, we deem it appropriate to affirm the orders of the High Court and dismiss the appeal.
10. Consequently and for the reasons alluded above, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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