(B.V. Nagarathna and Augustine George Masih, JJ.)
Arun Jain and Others _____________________________ Appellant(s);
v.
State of NCT of Delhi and Another _________________ Respondent(s).
Criminal Appeal No(s)./2024 (@ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 9178/2018), decided on April 1, 2024
The Order of the court was delivered by
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. Being aggrieved by the order dated 16.07.2018 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Crl. M.C. No. 381/2016 and Crl. M.A. No. 1618/2016, by which the application filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C.”) seeking quashing of order dated 28.09.2015 of the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate taking cognizance of the offences under Sections 498A, 406, 34 of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC” for short) and issuing summons to the appellants herein as accused on the basis of the final report dated 22.09.2015 made under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C has been dismissed, the appellants are before this Court.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondent-State. On perusal of the Office Report, it is noted that the second respondent-complainant is served but has not responded to the same and there is no representation on her behalf.
4. It is not in dispute that the marriage between appellant No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 took place on 01.11.1996. Thereafter, an ex-parte decree of Divorce was granted by the Family Court, Saket Courts Complex-South District, New Delhi dated 04.04.2013. Thereafter, a complaint was filed by respondent No. 2 against appellant No. 1 on 31.10.2013. On the basis of said complaint, an FIR was registered on 13.02.2014, subsequent to the divorce decree passed by the Family Court on 04.04.2013. On conclusion of the investigation into the First Information Report No. 20/2014 in respect of the complaint registered by respondent No. 2 herein in Crime Against Women cell, Nanak Pura.
5. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appellants herein sought quashing of the complaint filed by respondent No. 2 herein as well as all proceedings initiated pursuant to the said complaint by filing their application under section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court. The High Court, however, dismissed the said application vide impugned order dated 16.07.2018.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants during the course of his submissions relied upon the following judgments of this Court:
1. Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 8 SCC 781.
2. Mohd. Miyan v. the State of Uttar Pradesh (Crl. A. No. 1048/2018) dt.21.08.2018.
3. Iqbal Alias Bala v. State of U.P. (2023) 8 SCC 734.
4. Malakar v. State of Uttarakhand order dated 19.03.24.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent State however supported the impugned order and contended that there is no merit in this appeal.
8. This Court in the case of Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2022) 13 SCC 635, while considering quashing of proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in the context of the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, took into consideration the fact that there had been a settlement arrived at between the parties in the said case and therefore exercising jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India had quashed the complaint and the FIR and the subsequent criminal proceedings against the accused therein. The relevant portions of the said judgment are at paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 which are extracted as under:
“13. We, however, put a further caveat that the powers under Article 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in post-conviction matters only where an appeal is pending before one or the other Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction does not attain finality till the accused has exhausted his/her legal remedies and the finality is subjudice before an appellate court. The pendency of legal proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sine qua non to involve the superior court’s plenary powers to do complete justice. Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the basis of a compromise would be impermissible. Such an embargo is necessitated to prevent the accused from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a settlement/compromise will always be loaded with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. We have already clarified that the purpose of these extraordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow-hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but to do complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s).
14. With respect to the second question before us, it must be noted that even though the powers of this Court under Article 142 are wide and far reaching, the same cannot be exercised in a vacuum. True it is that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannot be constructed as a limitation on the Court’s power to do “complete justice”. However, this is not to say that this Court can altogether ignore the statutory provisions or other express prohibitions in law. In fact, the Court is obligated to take note of the relevant laws and will have to regulate the use of its power and discretion accordingly.
9. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 has eloquently clarified this point as follows:
“48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice “between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it”. The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by “ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling. It is well recognised and established that this Court has always been a law-maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute-settling. It is a “problem solver in the nebulous areas” (see K. Veeraswami v. Union of India) but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject matter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject.”
10. In the case of Mala Kar v. State of Uttarakhand (supra), this Court observed that the facts were that there had been a decree of divorce passed between the parties therein on 18.10.2014. It is thereafter that on 06.04.2015, the FIR was registered in respect of the criminal complaint filed on 09.08.2014. More significantly, the parties in the said case had since remarried and were leading their independent lives. Therefore, both parties had accepted the decree of divorce. In the above circumstances, this Court exercises powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to quash the criminal complaint as well as the FIR and all other criminal proceedings commenced thereto by setting aside the impugned order passed by the High Court.
11. Following the aforesaid judgments, in the instant case, it is noted that the appellants and respondent No. 2 were married on 01.11.1996 and a daughter was born to them on 19.04.2001. It is also stated by learned counsel for the appellants that appellant No. 1 left the matrimonial home on 23.04.2007 and thereafter respondent No. 2 sought divorce which was granted by the Competent Court on 04.04.2013. It was only thereafter on 31.10.2013 that respondent No. 2 filed the complaint against the appellants herein and the FIR was registered on 13.02.2014 and the chargesheet was filed on 22.09.2015. It is also to be noted that the proceedings initiated under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 in the year 2008 by respondent No. 2 herein culminated in the dismissal of the said proceeding on merits by order dated 28.07.2017 which has attained finality. Having regard to the aforesaid peculiar and crucial aspects of the present case and by following the order dated 19.03.2024, the appeal is liable to be allowed as we find that this is a fit case where we can exercise powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
12. Hence, the appeal is allowed. Consequently, the order dated 16.07.2018 passed by the High Court is set aside and the criminal proceedings initiated pursuant to FIR 20/2014 stand quashed.
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