(Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih, JJ.)
Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare ________________________ Petitioner;
v.
State of Maharashtra and Others _________________ Respondent(s).
Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 127 of 2026§, decided on July 24, 2026
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sanjay Karol, J.:—
1. The present writ petition has been instituted by the petitioner under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking, principally, quashing of multiple First Information Reports1 registered in different States of the country. In the alternative, the petitioner seeks clubbing and consolidation of the subject FIRs, along with a direction to conduct one composite investigation by a single investigating agency, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings; conflicting investigations and possibly judicial opinions. For ready reference, the reliefs sought in the writ petition are extracted hereunder:
“(a) Issue a writ of certiorari quashing the following Complaints/FIRs filed against the Petitioner as mentioned.
(b) Quash and set aside all the FIRs lodged in Maharashtra Pune Cyber Police Station Pune City with FIR No. 0499 of 2024 Bengaluru with Crime No. 412 of 2024, and Crime No. 275/2024 and in Odisha with Crime No. 32 of 2024, under section 120B,170, 389, 417, 419, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 506 R/w 35, 36, 37 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and section 43, 66(c) and 66(d) of I.T. Act.
(c) In the alternative, direct that all the above-mentioned FIRs be clubbed and consolidated, and further direct that only one composite investigation be carried out, preferably by a single investigating agency, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting investigations.
(d) Pass any other just and equitable order in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.”
2. The subject FIRs have been registered in the States of Maharashtra, Karnataka and Odisha under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 18602 and the Information Technology Act, 20003. At this juncture, it would be apposite to set out the details of the FIRs which form the subject matter of the present proceedings:
| S. No. | FIR No. | Date | Offences | Police Station/District |
| KARNATAKA | ||||
| 1. | 0275 of 2024 | 10.05.2024 | Sections 419, 420, 384 and 506 of IPC; and Section 66(C) and 66(D) of IT Act | Central CEN Crime PS; District: Bengaluru City |
| 2. | 0412 of 2024 | 13.05.2024 | Section 420 IPC; and Sections 43, 66(C) and 66(D) of IT Act | East CEN Crime PS; District: Bengaluru City |
| MAHARASHTRA | ||||
| 3. | 0499 of 2024 | 04.06.2024 | Sections 419, 420 and 34 of IPC; and Section 66(D) of IT Act | Pune City Cyber Police Station; District: Pune City |
| ODISHA | ||||
| 4. | 0032 of 2024 | 06.12.2024 | Sections 419, 420, 465, 467 and 120-B IPC; and Sections 66(C) and 66(D) of the IT Act | Cyber PS Rourkela; District: Rourkela |
3. The allegations, as emerging from these FIRs, pertain to incidents of cyber fraud, wherein the complainants were contacted by unknown persons posing as police officials and were falsely informed that several money laundering activities had been carried out in their names. On this pretext, the complainants were induced to transfer large sums of money to various bank accounts for verification and investigation. It is alleged that a part of the money, so transferred, was credited to Account No. 50200085120507 maintained in the name of ‘M/s Al Zeba Marinen Overseas’, a proprietary concern of the petitioner. Though the petitioner is not named as an accused in the subject FIRs, the aforesaid bank account belonging to his proprietary concern finds a mention therein.
4. The petitioner, however, denies the aforesaid allegations and contends that he has no role in the commission of these alleged offences. According to him, he had permitted his friend, Mr. Ganesh Khaire, to use the aforesaid bank account on a commission basis to run an online gaming business. It is contended that the said bank account was, thereafter, operated by Mr. Ganesh Khaire, and one Mr. Krishnakant Sharma. The petitioner further states that upon becoming aware of the misuse of the bank account, he lodged a Cyber Crime Complaint dated 09.05.2024 against the said persons, alleging that they had fraudulently used the bank account of his proprietary concern for unlawful money transfers.
5. It is in this background that the petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking, inter alia, quashing of the subject FIRs or, in the alternative, their clubbing and consolidation. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record.
Whether the subject FIRs should be quashed?
6. The principal relief sought by the petitioner is the quashing of the subject FIRs. Before examining whether such relief deserves to be granted, it would be apposite to consider whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution is maintainable for seeking quashing of an FIR.
7. Article 32 of the Constitution is the constitutional conduit through which this Court may issue ‘appropriate’ writs for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III. The right to approach this Court under Article 32 is itself a fundamental right and has been aptly described by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as the ‘heart and soul’ of the Constitution. The jurisdiction conferred under Article 32 is undoubtedly wide. At the same time, it is an extraordinary remedy which must be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances, particularly when it is necessary to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the infringement of fundamental rights.
8. It is well settled that the power of this Court under Article 32 is broad enough to quash criminal proceedings in an appropriate case, so as to prevent abuse of the process of law. The existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not, by itself, bar the exercise of jurisdiction. However, as a matter of judicial principle and orderly procedure, an aggrieved party is expected, in the ordinary course, to firstly approach the High Court. It is only where the facts disclose a violation of fundamental right(s) or other compelling circumstances that this Court would directly exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 32. [See: Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras4; Union of India v. Paul Manickam5; Jagisha Arora v. State of U.P.6; and Sunil Kumar Rai v. State of Bihar7]
9. At this juncture, it would be pertinent to refer to a few judicial pronouncements of this Court wherein the principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32 for quashing criminal proceedings have been considered:
9.1. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India8, held that although a petition under Article 32 to quash the FIR is maintainable, the petitioner should ordinarily be relegated to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC unless exceptional circumstances exist. It observed as under. The ratio reads as under:
“57. … Whether the allegations contained in the FIR do or do not make out any offence as alleged will not be decided in pursuance of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, to quash the FIR. The petitioner must be relegated to the pursuit of the remedies available under the CrPC, which we hereby do. The petitioner has an equally efficacious remedy available before the High Court. We should not be construed as holding that a petition under Article 32 is not maintainable. But when the High Court has the power under Section 482, there is no reason to by-pass the procedure under the CrPC, we see no exceptional grounds or reasons to entertain this petition under Article 32. There is a clear distinction between the maintainability of a petition and whether it should be entertained. …”
(emphasis supplied)
[See also: Amish Devgan v. Union of India9]
9.2. This Court, in Vinod Dua v. Union of India10, in exercise of its power under Article 32, quashed the FIR registered against the petitioner therein, having found that the allegations levelled against him directly impinged upon his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a). While doing so, this Court reiterated that the practice of relegating the petitioner to approach the High Court before approaching this Court is a matter of self-discipline and that there is no bar on this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution to quash the criminal proceedings.
“30. In Jagisha Arora v. State of U.P. [Jagisha Arora v. State of U.P., (2019) 6 SCC 619 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 881], this Court entertained a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution against an order of remand passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate despite the objection that the order must be challenged in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The discussion was : (SCC pp. 619-20, paras 2-7)
“… … …
5. As a matter of self-imposed discipline and considering the pressure of mounting cases on this Court, it has become the practice of this Court to ordinarily direct that the High Court first be approached even in cases of violation of fundamental rights. However, Article 32 which is itself a fundamental right cannot be rendered nugatory in a glaring case of deprivation of liberty as in the instant case, where the jurisdictional Magistrate has passed an order of remand till 22-6-2019 which means that the petitioner’s husband Prashant Kanojia would be in custody for about 13/14 days for putting up posts/tweets on the social media. …
… … …
31. Thus, the practice of directing that the High Court be approached first even in cases of violation of fundamental rights, is more of a self-imposed discipline by this Court; but in glaring cases of deprivation of liberty, this Court has entertained petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. We may, at this stage, also notice the following observations made in Union of India v. Paul Manickam [Union of India v. Paul Manickam, (2003) 8 SCC 342 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 239] : (SCC p. 356, para 22)
“22. Another aspect which has been highlighted is that many unscrupulous petitioners are approaching this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the order of detention directly without first approaching the High Courts concerned. It is appropriate that the High Court concerned under whose jurisdiction the order of detention has been passed by the State Government or Union Territory should be approached first. In order to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution to approach this Court directly, it has to be shown by the petitioner as to why the High Court has not been approached, could not be approached or it is futile to approach the High Court. Unless satisfactory reasons are indicated in this regard, filing of petition in such matters directly under Article 32 of the Constitution is to be discouraged.”
(emphasis supplied)
9.3. More recently, in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P.11, this Court reaffirmed that a writ petition under Article 32 seeking quashing of an FIR is maintainable where grievance discloses a violation of a fundamental right. It was held that:
“89. We shall now proceed to address the question as to whether a writ petition invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution would be maintainable for seeking quashing of an FIR and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
90. This Court, as the highest constitutional court, has been conferred with the powers as enshrined under Part III of the Constitution to provide remedies against the violation of fundamental rights. The very fact that the right to constitutional remedies has itself been enshrined as a fundamental right is a clear affirmation that this Court is the ultimate guarantor of their enforcement. Once the Constitution has cast such a responsibility upon it, this Court need not direct a petitioner to pursue an alternative remedy, when the grievance stems from the alleged violation of a fundamental right.
91. At the same time, although, as a matter of orderly procedure and judicial discipline, an aggrieved party is expected, in the ordinary course, to first approach the High Court, yet where facts disclose a palpable violation of the fundamental rights necessitating urgent intervention, it is incumbent upon this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, to step in and secure justice. In such circumstances, the existence of an alternative remedy cannot dilute the constitutional mandate entrusted to this Court. That is why it is said that “Let justice be done, though the Heavens may fall”.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. In the present case, the petitioner has only contended that, (i) he was serving abroad on a merchant ship; (ii) had no knowledge of the alleged transactions; and (iii) that the aforesaid bank account was operated and misused by Mr. Ganesh Khaire and Mr. Krishnakant Sharma. In our considered opinion, the petitioner has failed to establish infringement of any fundamental right warranting the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 32. He has also not been able to show the existence of any exceptional or exigent circumstances so as to justify bypassing the procedure available under CrPC.
11. In these circumstances, before this Court can embark upon an enquiry as to whether the subject FIRs should be quashed, it would be appropriate for him to pursue the remedies available under Article 226 of the Constitution and/or Section 482 CrPC. We are, therefore, not inclined to grant reliefs sought in prayer (a) and (b) of the writ petition.
Alternative relief – Clubbing of the FIRs
12. In the alternative, the petitioner has prayed for the clubbing and consolidation of the subject FIRs and for a direction that one composite investigation be carried out by a single investigating agency. According to the petitioner, all the FIRs arise out of the same set of allegations and disclose commission of similar offences. It is contended that permitting multiple FIRs and investigations in different jurisdictions viz., Maharashtra, Karnataka and Odisha, would result in multiplicity of proceedings, conflicting findings and serious prejudice to the petitioner.
13. Per contra, the respondent States contend that the prayer for clubbing deserves to be rejected. According to them, each of the subject FIRs is filed by a distinct complainant in relation to an independent transaction and separate acts constituting cognizable offences. Therefore, the investigating agencies in respective States are competent to investigate offences committed within their jurisdiction in accordance with law.
14. The law governing registration of multiple FIRs is fairly well settled. This Court has consistently held that there cannot be a second FIR in respect of the same incident or occurrence or in respect of the incidents which form a part of the same transaction. At the same time, where the subsequent FIR, inter alia, relates to a distinct occurrence or offence; is a counter-complaint; or reveals a larger conspiracy, the registration of the same is permissible.
14.1. In T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala12, this Court held that no successive FIRs could be filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction. It was observed as under:
“18. … All other informations made orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the cognizable offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the first information report and entered in the station house diary by the police officer or such other cognizable offences as may come to his notice during the investigation, will be statements falling under Section 162 CrPC. No such information/statement can properly be treated as an FIR and entered in the station house diary again, as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC. Take a case where an FIR mentions cognizable offence under Section 307 or 326 IPC and the investigating agency learns during the investigation or receives fresh information that the victim died, no fresh FIR under Section 302 IPC need be registered which will be irregular; in such a case alteration of the provision of law in the first FIR is the proper course to adopt.
… … …
20. From the above discussion it follows that under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 CrPC only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 CrPC. Thus there can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the FIR in the station house diary, the officer in charge of a police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 CrPC.
… … …
27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case [(1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 CrPC, nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)
[See also: Amit Katyal v. State of Haryana13]
14.2. Significantly, in Babubhai v. State of Gujarat14 this Court held that the ‘test of sameness’ has to be applied to determine whether two FIRs relate to the same incident or form different parts of the same transaction. It held that if the answer is in the affirmative, the second FIR ought to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is different or is in respect of a different incident/crime, then a subsequent FIR is permissible. [See also: Arnab Ranjan Goswami (supra)]
14.3. In Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P.15 this Court held that registration of a second FIR is permissible where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different; or relate to an incident of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the first FIR. It was observed as under:
“14. … It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence. However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most important aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of power by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered. …
15. It has to be examined on the merits of each case whether a subsequently registered FIR is a second FIR about the same incident or offence or is based upon distinct and different facts and whether its scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. It will not be appropriate for the court to lay down one straitjacket formula uniformly applicable to all cases. This will always be a mixed question of law and facts depending upon the merits of a given case.
… … …
25. … The court in order to examine the impact of one or more FIRs has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of “sameness” to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence, are in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two distinct occurrences. If the answer falls in the first category, the second FIR may be liable to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, whether the version of the second FIR is different and they are in respect of two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible, …”
(emphasis supplied)
14.4. More recently, this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore16, through one of us (Sanjay Karol, J.), referring to the earlier decisions of this Court, summarised the principles regarding the permissibility of the registration of a second FIR, in the following terms:
“9. From the above conspectus of judgments, inter alia, the following principles emerge regarding the permissibility of the registration of a second FIR:
9.1 When the second FIR is counter-complaint or presents a rival version of a set of facts, in reference to which an earlier FIR already stands registered.
9.2 When the ambit of the two FIRs is different even though they may arise from the same set of circumstance es.
9.3 When investigation and/or other avenues reveal the earlier FIR or set of facts to be part of a larger conspiracy.
9.4 When investigation and/or persons related to the incident bring to the light hitherto unknown facts or circumstances.
9.5 Where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different.”
(emphasis supplied)
15. A conspectus of the decisions referred to above makes it clear, inter alia, that registration of multiple FIRs is impermissible if they relate to the same incident or form part of the same transaction. However, where the subsequent FIR relates to a distinct offence/incident or a separate transaction, its registration cannot be faulted. The meaning of what constitutes ‘same transaction’ or ‘distinct offence’ has been succinctly explained by this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja17, wherein the Court laid down triple tests, though not to be applied cumulatively, to decide whether separate actions can be treated as part of the ‘same transaction’ – (i) unity of purpose and design; (ii) proximity of time and place; and (iii) continuity of action. The relevant part thereof is reproduced hereunder:
“10. In Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala v. Union of India6, this Court dealt with the question as to what is meant by ‘every distinct offence’. It was held that ‘distinct’ meant ‘not identical’ and two offences would be distinct if they are not, in any way, inter-related. It was further held that if there is some inter-relation, there would be no distinctness and it would depend upon the circumstances of the case in which the offences were committed whether there be separate charges for those offences or not.
11. In Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed that, what is to be ascertained under Section 235(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (equivalent to Section 218(1) CrPC), was whether the offences arise out of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction. It was noted that ‘same transaction’ is not defined anywhere in the 1898 Code and it was held that whether transactions can be regarded as the same transaction would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case. The Bench noted that the general thought is that, where there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction. The Bench, however, cautioned that it is not necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist for transactions to be regarded as the same transaction … Noting that a transaction may consist of an isolated act or a series of acts, the Bench held that such series of acts must, of necessity, be connected with one another and if some of them stand out independently, they would not form part of the same transaction but would constitute a different transaction. It was concluded that the ‘same transaction’ means a transaction consisting either of a single act or of a series of connected acts.
12. In State of Jharkhand through SP, Central Bureau of Investigation v. Lalu Prasad Yadav alias Lalu Prasad7, this Court observed that even if the modus operandi is the same, it would not make it a single offence when the offences are separate. This Court held that, if a conspiracy is furthered into several distinct offences, there have to be separate trials.…
… … …
20. As already noted hereinabove, precedential law has laid down triple tests, though not to be applied cumulatively, to decide when separate actions can be treated as part of the ‘same transaction’ – 1) unity of purpose and design; 2) proximity of time and place; and 3) continuity of action. These tests may be applied to ascertain whether a series of acts form part of the same transaction or not. … If, however, it is concluded that there are several transactions and distinct offences in relation to different victims, there have to be separate trials for each offence, subject to Section 219 CrPC/Section 242 BNSS, which allows the Trial Court to try three/five offences of the same kind committed within a year. Once all the incidents are taken to be part of the same transaction and amalgamated into one FIR, the punishment would follow accordingly as per law.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. Keeping in view the above exposition of law, we are unable to grant the relief of clubbing and consolidation of the subject FIRs, as sought in prayer (c) of the writ petition. In the present case, each of the subject FIRs has been lodged by a different complainant who was allegedly induced to part with money on different occasions but with no live link or connectivity of transactions inter se different set of persons. The mere fact that a part of the defrauded amounts is alleged to have been transferred in the bank account of petitioner’s proprietary concern does not, by itself, establish that all the incidents form part of the same transaction. Though the alleged modus operandi appears to be similar, the victims, the amounts involved, the transactions complained of and the consequences suffered are distinct. Prima facie, therefore, the subject FIRs relate to separate transactions disclosing distinct offences and cannot be said to arise out of the same transaction.
17. The petitioner has also urged that, owing to his serious cardiac ailments and diabetic condition, it would be difficult for him to face proceedings in different States. While we are not oblivious to this fact, however, such difficulty cannot be a ground to direct clubbing of FIRs which otherwise disclose commission of distinct offences. On the other hand, clubbing the subject FIRs may cause hardship to the complainants as they would be forced to run from pillar to post to pursue their criminal complaints.
18. We are also mindful of the fact that the investigation is still in its nascent stage. Cyber frauds of the present nature are often executed through complex technological means involving multiple bank accounts, fictitious identities and digital networks operating across different jurisdictions. Investigation into such offences, as rightly contended by the learned counsel(s) for the respondent States, necessarily requires detailed forensic examination of electronic evidence, analysis of banking transactions and tracing of money trails so as to identify the people involved. Given that the investigating agencies are yet to ascertain the complete flow of funds and unravel the entire chain of events, a direction for a composite investigation may impede a fair and effective investigation. Several cyber frauds are now on the rise and the offence, considering its gravity and implications cannot be taken lightly. More so, when the victims of crime largely hailing from the rural areas, unaware and ignorant of the process and the mechanism adopted by the criminals are allured to overcome their poverty.
19. In light of the above, this writ petition is accordingly dismissed. We expressly clarify that liberty is reserved to the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum to seek appropriate relief(s) as he may be entitled to in law and/or avail any other remedy as may be available in law, if so advised. All contentions of the parties are left open, which shall be considered by the competent Court on their own merits and in accordance with law.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
———
1 ‘FIRs’ for short.
2 ‘IPC’ for short.
3 ‘IT Act’ for short.
4 1950 SCC 436.
5 (2003) 8 SCC 342.
6 (2019) 6 SCC 619.
7 (2024) 17 SCC 592.
8 (2020) 14 SCC 12.
9 (2021) 1 SCC 1.
10 (2023) 14 SCC 286.
11 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265.
12 (2001) 6 SCC 181.
13 2026 SCC OnLine SC 890.
14 (2010) 12 SCC 254.
15 (2013) 6 SCC 384.
16 2025 SCC OnLine SC 358.
17 2026 SCC OnLine SC 19.
§ 2026 INSC 740
