(B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.)
U.F.M. Mukund ________________________________ Appellant;
v.
Shriman Niranjan Shri Shivaling Mahaswamigalu Guru Shri Gurusidda Rajayogindra Mahaswamigalu, Bannadmath, Chowkimath Sirsi and Others ________________________________________ Respondent(s).
Civil Appeal No. of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20827 of 2024), decided on January 30, 2026
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B.V. Nagarathna, J.:—
1. Leave granted.
2. Being aggrieved by the order dated 22.07.2024 passed in W.P. No. 147834 of 2020 (GM-CPC) passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad bench, the appellant is before this Court.
3. The relevant facts of the case are that the appellant herein suffered an order of eviction by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, first appellate court as well as by the High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 854 of 2016 which was disposed of on 20.06.2017. The aforesaid judgment passed in the Regular Second Appeal was a subject matter of challenge before this Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 24439 of 2017.
4. This Court declined to interfere on the merits of the case. However, this Court in order to balance the equities between the parties passed the following order:
“Shri S.N. Bhat, Adv. raised the spectre of lack of inherent jurisdiction. We are not impressed for the reason that conditions 1, 3 and 6 of the lease deed dated 04.04.1966 have been found to have been breached by all the courts. However, Shri Bhat states that the trial court had permitted him to raise valuation of the structure that was erected by him and the fact that the payment for such structure should be made before possession is taken by the landlord. We set aside the High Court order only to this limited extent and permit Shri Bhat to raise the aforesaid in the execution proceedings.
The Special Leave Petitions are disposed of accordingly.
Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.”
5. On the basis of the observations made by this Court, the appellant herein filed an application seeking appointment of panchayatdars/advocate commissioners for the purpose of valuation of the cinema hall put up by the appellant herein. By order dated 21.09.2019 the Executing Court viz., the Court of the learned Principal Civil Judge, Sirsi, passed an order in Execution Case No. 225 of 2013, the operative portion of which reads as follows:
“ORDER
The judgment debtors are entitled for the value of the building before handing over possession of suit schedule property to the D. Hrs.
Instead of Panchayathdars, both parties shall suggest an expert and an Advocate Commissioner to fix the value of the suit property.
Commissioner fee will be fixed while appointing court commissioner.
Both parties are at liberty to file memo of instructions after appointing court commissioner.
Call on 09.10.2019.”
6. The aforesaid order was assailed by the respondent herein before the High Court of Karnataka (Dharwad Bench) in W.P. NO. 147834 of 2020(GM-CPC). By the impugned order the said Writ Petition was allowed and the order dated 21.09.2019 passed by the learned Principal Civil Judge, Sirsi in Execution Case No. 225 of 2013 was quashed and a direction was issued to enforce the decree so that the decree holder may be able to enjoy the fruits of the decree at the earliest.
7. In this appeal, by interim order dated 29.08.2025, this Court directed the appellant herein to handover the possession of the subject property to the respondent herein. For ease of reference, the said order dated 29.08.2025 is extracted as under:
“We have heard learned senior counsel for the respective parties.
The petitioner shall hand over the possession of the subject premises to the respondent(s) within a period of four weeks from today.
It is needless to observe that the handing over of the possession by the petitioner to the respondent(s) is without prejudice to all rights and contentions that it has with regard to the valuation of the structure that is said to have put up on the subject premises.”
8. This interim order is in consonance with the order dated 03.10.2017 passed earlier by this Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 24439 of 2017.
9. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the possession of the subject property has already been handed over to the respondent, which fact is also admitted by learned counsel for the respondent. However, the grievance of the appellant is that the High Court failed to appreciate the import of the order passed by this Court on 03.10.2017 whereas the Executing Court had appreciated the same and had passed the impugned order dated 21.09.2019 which has been set aside by the High Court.
10. Learned senior counsel submitted that when once this Court had balanced the equities between the parties, the same could not have been ignored by the High Court by terming the order of this Court as being “inconsequential”. He drew our attention to various portions of the impugned order to submit that the High Court has grossly failed to appreciate the import of the order of this Court even while dismissing the appellants’ special leave petitions. He contended that the Trial Court had rightly understood the order of this Court and had passed the order dated 21.09.2019; that the respondent ought not to have filed the Writ Petition assailing the said order of the Executing Court. Learned senior counsel therefore submitted that the impugned order may be set aside and consequently, the order dated 21.09.2019 passed by the learned Principal Civil Judge, Sirsi, be sustained.
11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent contended that merely because this Court had ordered that the appellant could raise a claim with regard to the building constructed and improvements made on the subject matter, did not entitle the appellant to any monetary compensation. Apprehending that such a compensation may be granted to the appellant herein, the respondent preferred the Writ Petition. The High Court rightly allowed the Writ Petition of the respondent and set aside the order of the learned Principal Civil Judge, Sirsi. He therefore submitted that there is no merit in this appeal.
12. In light of the orders passed by this Court as well as the Executing Court, we find that the Executing Court rightly understood the thrust of the observations made by this Court while dismissing the special leave petitions.
13. It is reiterated that this Court while directing the appellant herein to handover possession of the subject property to the respondent herein and declining to interfere on the merits of the case, however was of the view that having regard to the lease in question being for fifty nine years and the fact that there were improvements made on the subject property inasmuch as a cinema hall was constructed on the subject property, reserved liberty to the appellant herein to make a claim. The Executing Court was considering that aspect of the matter. The same has been frustrated by the High Court by the impugned order.
14. We also note that there was no bar under the agreement of lease for the appellant to seek compensation in the event the lease was terminated prematurely and the subject property had to be handed over to the respondent herein. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that this Court had sought to balance the equities and rights of the parties.
15. On perusal of the impugned order, we find that the learned Single Judge of the High Court has noted that this Court had granted the appellants herein (respondents before the High Court) liberty to raise the issue of building’s valuation before the possession was handed over “effectively modifying the High Court’s order to this limited extent”.
16. The High Court has thereafter perused the issues framed by the trial Court in Original Suit No. 51 of 2007; the observations of the trial Court have been extracted and the decree as well passed in the said suit. The High Court has further noted that the first appellate Court reversed the observations made by the trial Court in regard to the judgment debtor’s entitlement to seek valuation of the building, and the fact that the High Court had dismissed the second appeal by observing that the trial Court was not right in making observations concerning the valuation of the cinema theatre building.
17. This Court while disposing of the special leave petitions expressly permitted to the limited extent to raise the issue of valuation of the structure that was erected by the appellant herein in the execution proceedings. We find that the observations of the High Court on the order of this Court could have been avoided.
18. As noted above, while disposing of the special leave petitions, this Court has expressly recorded that a claim could be raised in the execution proceedings with regard to the valuation of the structure that was erected by the appellant. Further, the special leave petitions were not dismissed but disposed of by this Court by recording the above. Therefore, it was wholly unnecessary for the High Court to go into a discussion and seek to interpret this Court’s order; to make an examination as to whether the liberty granted by this Court was binding on the decree holder or not; and thereafter to observe that the Executing Court has misinterpreted the order of this Court. It was also not necessary to discuss whether the doctrine of merger applied in the instant case or not as the special leave petitions were not dismissed by this Court but disposed of, which the High Court has failed to notice.
19. The High Court has in fact proceeded on the premise that this Court had dismissed the special leave petitions, which is erroneous. To also observe that the order of this Court should be interpreted in a limited manner is also incorrect. Further, the observation that the Executing Court could not go beyond the decree “in view of the dismissal of the special leave petition by the Hon’ble Apex Court” is also not correct, as already noted above, this Court did not dismiss the special leave petitions but had disposed them. We find that the very filing of the writ petition was abuse of process of law and hence the writ petition itself is dismissed.
20. In the circumstances, we set aside the order 22.07.2024 passed in W.P. No. 147834 of 2020 (GM-CPC) passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad bench.
21. Consequently, we direct the Executing Court to proceed with the consideration of the claim made by the appellant herein in terms of the order passed by this Court and in accordance with law.
22. This appeal is allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms. No costs.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).20827/2024 [Arising Out of Impugned Final Judgment and Order Dated 22-07-2024 in WP No. 147834/2020 Passed by the High Court of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad]
U.F.M. Mukund.….Petitioner(s)
Versus
Shriman Niranjan Shri Shivaling Mahaswamigalu Represented by General Power of Attorney Holder & Ors.….Respondent(s)
IA No. 228745/2025 – Modification of Court Order
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
ORDER
Leave granted.
Appeal is allowed and disposed of in terms of the signed non-reportable judgment, which is placed on file.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
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