(B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.)
Civil Appeal No. 3876 of 2017, decided on January 22, 2026
Jaipur Development Authority _______________________ Appellant;
v.
Jamea Hidayat Trust and Others ____________________ Respondent(s).
With
Civil Appeal No. 3871 of 2017
Civil Appeal No. 3874 of 2017
Civil Appeal No. 3872 of 2017
Civil Appeal No. 3873 of 2017
Civil Appeal No. 3875 of 2017
Civil Appeal No. 3882 of 2017
Civil Appeal No. 3883 of 2017
Civil Appeal No. 3877 of 2017
Civil Appeal No. 3881 of 2017
Civil Appeal No. 3878 of 2017
Civil Appeal No. 3880 of 2017
Civil Appeal Nos. 15528-15531 of 2017
Civil Appeal No. 3876 of 2017; Civil Appeal No. 3871 of 2017; Civil Appeal No. 3874 of 2017; Civil Appeal No. 3872 of 2017; Civil Appeal No. 3873 of 2017; Civil Appeal No. 3875 of 2017; Civil Appeal No. 3882 of 2017; Civil Appeal No. 3883 of 2017; Civil Appeal No. 3877 of 2017; Civil Appeal No. 3881 of 2017; Civil Appeal No. 3878 of 2017; Civil Appeal No. 3880 of 2017; and Civil Appeal Nos. 15528-15531 of 2017
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B.V. Nagarathna, J.
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3876 OF 2017; 3871 OF 2017; 3874 OF 2017; 3872 OF 2017; 3873 OF 2017; 3875 OF 2017; 3882 OF 2017; 3883 OF 2017; 3877 OF 2017; 3881 OF 2017; 3878 OF 2017; 3880 OF 2017:
Jaipur Development Authority (“JDA”, for the sake of convenience) has preferred these appeals being aggrieved by the common order dated 11.01.2010 in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) Nos. 500 of 2009, 501 of 2009, 489 of 2009, 492 of 2009, 442 of 2009 and 443 of 2009.
2. Briefly stated, the facts in the present appeals are that the late Sri Maharaja Sawai Man Singh was the ruler of the erstwhile Princely State of Jaipur. By way of an Instrument of Accession executed between the erstwhile Maharaja Sawai Man Singh and the Dominion of India, the said State of Jaipur came to be a part of the Dominion of India and later part of the State of Rajasthan. The said Instrument of Accession recognised the right of the erstwhile Maharaja Sawai Man Singh to retain certain movable and immovable assets which were distinct from the property of the State of Rajasthan. Among these private assets of the erstwhile Maharaja existed two parcels of land, admeasuring 542 bighas and 19 biswas in Village Lalwas and 917 bighas and 1 biswa in Village Amber respectively. The total extent of these lands is 1460 bighas.
3. On 20.09.1963, the erstwhile Maharaja sold 1300 bighas of the aforesaid land, known as “Honey Dew Range”, to M/S S.M.S Investment Corporation Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “S.M.S”) for a total sale consideration of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand Only). By virtue of Section 14 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter, “the 1955 Act”), S.M.S attained the status of a khatedar tenant in respect of the said lands.
4. Despite the above sale transaction, on 07.11.1975, the Collector, Jaipur initiated proceedings for acquisition of the Estate of the erstwhile Maharaja and issued notices under Sections 9 and 9A of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners Estates Act, 1963 (hereinafter, “the 1963 Act”) stating, inter alia, that by virtue of Section 7 of the said Act, the lands vested in the State as on 01.09.1964.
5. On 17.04.1976, the Collector, Jaipur passed a further order in respect of the lands in Villages Lalwas and Amber, stating that the land admeasuring 1300 bighas was to be deleted from the operation of the 1963 Act, owing to the same having been sold earlier and the remaining land admeasuring 160 bighas of land in Amber was to be acquired by the State Government.
6. The order of the Collector dated 17.04.1976 came to be challenged by Sawai Bhawani Singh, who was the son of the erstwhile Maharaja in Writ Petition No. 743/1976 and also by one Gandhi Grih Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. in Writ Petition No. 1534/1976. As the issue related to the determination of the nature of the lands under Section 10(2) of the 1963 Act and a similar dispute relating to another ex-Ruler was pending before the Compensation Commissioner, the High Court set aside the order dated 17.04.1976 that sought to acquire the land admeasuring 160 bighas and referred the dispute to be determined by the Compensation Commissioner.
7. Subsequently, it appears Jamea Hidayat Trust purchased from various khatedar-tenants, land admeasuring 82 bighas and 2 biswas situated in Village Amber and land admeasuring 70 bighas and 17 biswas of land in Village Lalwas, that formed a part of the 1300 bighas of land in the “Honey Dew Range”.
8. On 20.06.1991, a meeting of the Land and Property Committee, JDA was convened wherein it was decided that land situated in Village Lalwas admeasuring 81 bighas and 14 biswas shall be allotted by the appellant-JDA to the Central Reserve Police Force. Further, on 30.07.1991, land situated in Village Lalwas admeasuring 189 bighas and 12 biswas and land situated in Village Amber admeasuring 310 bighas was allotted to the Rajasthan Police. A formal order of allotment was issued on 20.08.1991. S.M.S challenged both the orders dated 20.06.1991 and allotment letter dated 20.08.1991 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1172/1992, seeking that they be quashed and set aside.
9. In the interregnum, on 30.10.1991, the Collector addressed a communication to the Tahsildar to take action against S.M.S under Section 63 of the 1955 Act and that land revenue be recovered from S.M.S. It was also mentioned that Jamea Hidayat Trust had also claimed to be a purchaser of some portion of the disputed land. Another communication was addressed by the Collector to the Tahsildar on 15.11.1991 stating that 1300 bighas of the land in Village Lalwas was sold by the erstwhile Maharaja to S.M.S, but S.M.S had not taken possession of the said land. As a result, action under Sections 63(1)(iv) and 63)(1)(vii) of the 1955 Act would be required to be taken. Pursuant to these communications, the Tahsildar on 19.11.1991, declared the lands to be “Sivay Chak” or “State Land” and directed that the revenue records be mutated accordingly. These communications between the Collector and the Tahsildar’s order dated 19.11.1991 came to be assailed by S.M.S in Writ Petition No. 7114/1991.
10. The aforesaid order dated 19.11.1991 was also assailed by one Nathu Singh and Abdul Rashid Mir in Writ Petition No. 4878/1992, wherein they contended that they each had leased out portions of the land. The writ petition came to be disposed of on the basis that the lessor’s interests in the land were still under determination in the proceedings before the Compensation Commissioner under Section 10(2) of the 1963 Act and the lessee’s rights would also be determined by the Compensation Commissioner. Nathu Singh challenged this order before a Division Bench of the High Court in Special Appeal No. 191/1994. During the pendency of this appeal, Nathu Singh further signed a Deed of Relinquishment dated 01.04.2005 in favour of S.M.S relinquishing possession of the land, and all of his rights and interests in the said land in favour of S.M.S. However, this fact was not brought to the notice of the High Court. Hence, the High Court held that Nathu Singh, having no rights or interest in the land was, in-effect, a trespasser and his possession had been rendered illegal by virtue of the Deed of Relinquishment.
11. Further, by agreement to sell dated 09.04.2005 (which was subsequently finalised by sale deed dated 01.05.2009), M/s Ridhi Sidhi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “Ridhi Sidhi”) purchased two parcels of land admeasuring 4 bighas and 30 bighas respectively in Village Amber out of the 1300 bighas of land claimed to be owned by S.M.S. Jamea Hidayat Trust and Ridhi Sidhi sought to be impleaded in Writ Petition Nos. 7114/1991 and 1172/1992, which was allowed.
12. By order dated 19.02.2009, the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at Jaipur dismissed Writ Petition Nos. 7114/1991 and 1172/1992 on the basis of them being “premature” as proceedings before the Compensation Commissioner was yet to conclude.
13. Feeling aggrieved, S.M.S, the Jamea Hidayat Trust and Ridhi Sidhi preferred appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at Jaipur.
14. By impugned order dated 11.01.2010, the Division Bench of the High Court was pleased to allow the appeals and set aside the orders under challenge on the basis that the land never vested in the JDA and the allotments to the Central Reserve Police Force and Rajasthan Police were invalid, as the JDA could not have allotted the said land which did not belong to the said Authority. That when the allotments took place, the land was not declared to be State Land. That the land in dispute was retained by the erstwhile Maharaja as private property with all associated rights and was later sold to S.M.S. That the action of the JDA and the State to allot the land was “unjustified, arbitrary, illegal and highly deplorable”. Vacant possession of the 1300 bighas of land was ordered to be handed over to the appellants before the High Court.
15. By the said order, the Division Bench has held that a parcel of land measuring 1300 Bighas has to be withdrawn from the allotment order and the allottees have to handover the vacant possession of the land from the appellant herein to the respondents herein and accordingly to make corrections in the revenue records. Hence, the instant civil appeal.
16. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant-JDA; learned AAG and learned counsel for the State of Rajasthan and learned ASG for the Union of India as well as learned senior counsel and counsel appearing for the respondents, at length. We have perused the material on record.
17. During the course of submissions, our attention was drawn to the order dated 17.04.1976 which was passed by the Collector of Jaipur. The said order was passed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Landowners Estate, 1963 (“1963 Act” for short). The relevant portion of the order concerning the subject lands reads as under:
“(9) AMER (LALWAS) The land measuring 142 Bighas 19 Biswas has been entered in village Lalwas and 917 Bighas 1 Biswas has been entered in village Amer. It is known as Honey Dew range. Out of this land 1300 Bighas have been sold to SMS Investment Corporation Limited on 20.09.1963. The learned counsel for the non applicant argued that the said land was not subject to acquisition by the state. The remaining land he claims to have let out by the late Highness in the year 1060-61 to various persons. So far the sale is concerned a regular registration deed produced before the undersigned was found to be in order. Hence the land measuring 1300 Bighas is to be deleted from the operation of the present law. However, on this land the Ceiling law if applicable may be applied by the concerning S.D.M. for the remaining land no valid proof has been produced by the non-applicant, hence cannot be exempted from the operation of the said Act. The remaining favour of the State Government.”
(underlining by us)
18. Admittedly, this order was not assailed by the State and insofar as the aforesaid portion of the land, the aforesaid attained finality because the remaining portion of the said order was assailed by the respondents. The reason for the subject land measuring 1300 Bighas being deleted from the operation of the 1963 Act was the acceptance of the fact that on 20.09.1963, the ex ruler of Jaipur had sold the said extent of land to the respondent – Corporation namely M/s. SMS Investment Corporation (P) Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as “SMS Corporation”). Copy of the sale deed produced as Ex.P1 reads as under:
“SALE
This Indenture of sale is made on the 20th day of September 1963 by His Highness Sawai Man Singhji Bahadur, the Maharaja of Jaipur through his attorney Rao Chandra Pal Singh, S/o late Thakur Dhyan Singh, Rajput, resident of 16, Civil Lines, Jaipur (hereinafter called the vendor which expression shall unless the context otherwise, admits, heirs, representatives and successors) of the lone part, in favour of S.M.S. Investment Corporation Private Limited, a registered Corporation having is registered office as Delhi (hereinafter called the purchaser) of the other part in respect or of the land known as beer lalwas:— situated in Tehsil Amber. District Jaipur. And Whereas the said vendor has agreed to sell and the said purchaser through its Director, Maharaj Kumar Shri Jai Singhji of Jaipur had agreed to purchase the abvoe mentioned property namely lalwas Beer about 1300 Bighas for a sum of Rs. 20,000/- and more particularly described and bounded within red lines on the blue print attached herewith this deed and which forms part of this deed. Now therefore in pursuance of the said agreement of sale this deed witnesseth as under:—
(1) That the said vendor has sold the above mentioned property to the above named purchaser for a sum of Rs. 20,000/- which has been a greed to be paid by the said purchaser through the said Director to the vendor within fifteen days from the execution of this deed.
(2) That the possession of the property has been delivered on behalf of the vendor to the said purchaser through the said director Maharaj Kumar Shri Jai Singhji of Jaipur.
(3) That the above mentioned property is free from all encumbrances.
(4) That all the interests, rights and title, hitherto vested in the vendor have now became vested in the purchaser.
(5) That hence forth the said purchaser is fully entitled to enjoy the said property in any way it likes.
In witness whereas the attorney of the vendor hath set his hand unto this deed the date and year above written.”
(underlining by us)
19. A reading of the said sale deed makes it apparent that the possession of the land in question was delivered on behalf of the vendor-ex Maharaja to the purchaser-SMS Corporation. It is because of acceptance of the said fact that the Collector in his order dated 17.04.1976 held that the Act does not apply to the extent of 1300 Bighas as referred to above.
20. When the matter stood thus, the office of the Tahsildar, Amber initiated proceedings under Section 63(7) and 63(4) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1965 on the premise that the order dated 17.04.1976 passed by the Collector under the Act had been set aside and therefore 1300 Bighas of the said land was not deleted from the provisions of the said Act. There have been several other proceedings initiated in respect of the subject land and ultimately the Writ Petition Nos. 1172 of 1991 and 1141 of 1991 were filed by the respondents herein before the High Court. The learned Single Judge, however, dismissed the Writ Petitions against which appeals were filed by the respondents herein before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court while allowing the appeals has observed as under:
“33. The acquisition proceedings under the Act of 1963 are not applicable to the land in dispute. The acquisition proceedings are to be applied to the land defined under Section 2(f). Such land should be part of the estate of the Landowner on the date of commencement of the Act of 1963. The land in dispute at the time of commencement of the Act of 1963 was not a part o the estate of the land-owner. The Act came into force on 01.09.1964 whereas the land stood on 20.09.1963 prior to 01.09.1964. Therefore, the whole action of the Tehsildar is without jurisdiction. The Act of 1963 has been promulgated mainly for acquisition of the states of land-owners. The land in dispute, being not part of the estate at the time of commencement of the Act, was not liable to the acquisition proceedings.
34. The Collector and the Tehsildar have, not been able to rightly appreciate the order passed in Writ Petition No. 743/1976. In the writ petition the grievance was only with regard to 160 Bighas of land which order has been set aside, relegating the status of the Ex-ruler on spot as earlier existed before passing the order dated 17.04.1976. The Collector and the Tehsildar have committed a mistake in appreciating the order and directing the acquisition of whole parcel of land whereas the non-acquisition of the land is final so far as the land measuring 1300 Bighas is concerned, which stood excluded form acquisition under the provisions of the Act of 1963 by the Collector vide his order dated 17.04.1976 which was set aside by the High Court to the extent of 160 Bighas of land. Order dated 19.11.1991 passed by the Tehsildar declaring the whole land i.e., 1460 Bighas as State Land pursuant to the letters of the Collector dated 13.10.1991 and 15.11.1991 is erroneous on facts and law.
35. The land in dispute was retained by the Ex-ruler as private property with full rights of disposal under Plan 6(c) of the Covenant, as noticed in the preceding paragraphs. This land being the private property of the Ex-ruler under the Covenant is beyond the purview of acquisition and the Act of 1963 has no application over this land. Similar was the controversy raised in respect of land covered by Survey Nos. 421 and 426, retained by Ex-ruler, Maharaja of Jodhpur State as his private property with full rights of disposal, situated averting his Palace namely Umed Palace. The Collector issued notice under Section 9-A of the Act of 1963. The notice issued by the Collector came to be challenged by the Ex-ruler by means of Misc. Writ Petition No. 1872/1975 which came to be allowed vide order dated 20.12.1985 holding that as per the Covenant, it is the private property of the Ex-ruler and cannot be subjected to acquisition, relying upon the judgment delivered in case of Prajapati Grah Nirman Samiti Limited v. State of Rajasthan and the learned Single Judge quashed the notice issued by the Collector. The matter went up to the Supreme Court by means of Civil Appeal No. 1144-48 of 1987 and order dated 20.12.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge was maintained by the Apex Court.
36. The Collector in its letters dated 30.10.1991 and 15.11.1991 has directed the Tehsildar to proceed under Sections 63(1)(iv) and 63(1)(vii) of the Act of 1955 as the S.M.S. and the Trust not in possession of the land as order dated 17.04.1976 has been set aside by the Court. It is not denied by the respondents that the land purchased by the Trust is in possession of the Trust. It is also not denied that 19 Bighas of land purchased by Ridhi Sidhi is in possession of Ridhi Sidhi. The record of the Jamabandi showing SMS in the revenue record is also not denied. The S.M.S. had paid the land revenue in a sum of Rs. 1,24,000/- upto 1991 in respect of the whole land against the demand raised by the Tehsildar in the year 1997. After 1991 the land has been exempted from payment of land revenue by the State. Payment of land revenue also creates evidence of possession of the SMS.
xxx
38. The interest of the tenant in his holding shall be extinguished if he has been deprived of the possession and his right to recover the possession is barred by limitation in terms of Section 63(X)(iv) of the Act of 1955. From perusal of order dated 19.11.1991 it is not made out as to on what evidence the Collector has recorded that the SMS or the trust is not in possession. Possession of the Trust can be apparently verified on spot as on the land purchased by the Trust an educational institution is being run presently. So far as the possession of the SMS is concerned it has been reflected in the Jamabandi. Therefore, there was no evidence available before the Tehsildar except letters of the Collector to deprive the SMS of the possession which appears to be arbitrary. The Collector has also not written the letters based on any evidence or indicating any provision of law that the recovery of possession is barred by limitation. In that event if the appellant is deprived of the possession from a particular date mandated by law, it needs to be indicated in the order so that particular mandatory period of limitation could be counted. So far as Section 63(I)(vii) is concerned it prescribes that interest of the tenant in his holding or part thereof shall be extinguished if he sells or makes gift thereof in accordance with the provisions of this Act. It is also not made out and justified from the order dated 19.11.1991 by the Tehsildar as to how the sale made by the SMS is in accordance with the provisions of this Act. It has come out from the evidence that the SMS has approached the respondent/Revenue Officer for entering mutation in its name on the basis of the Sale Deed. It has also come on record from the letter dated 18.11.1991 of the appellant-SMS that it has made a request not only to Tehsildar but to the Collector and the Divisional Commissioner for attestation of the mutation in the year 1991 and prior to that but the application has been returned to the SMS to be presented before the Assistant Commissioner (Settlement). The applications filed prior to 1991 were presented before the Assistant Commissioner (Settlement) Amer Camp which remained pending and were not disposed of. The Trust has also made similar application for attestation of mutation before the Revenue Officer which is not denied by the respondents. It was the duty of the respondents to dispose of the applications one way or the other before passing order dated 19.11.1991. It was not within the power of the appellants to attest the mutation, they could only plead or request which they did. No reasons have been assigned by the respondents as to why the applications for attesting mutation and correction of the record were not disposed of. Viewed thus, the action of the respondents to proceed under the aforesaid provisions is arbitrary and uncalled for.
xxx
40. The Tehsildar notified the land in dispute as State Land vide his order dated 19.11.1991 though the land was in possession of the appellants. It never came to be vested with the JDA. Assuming it is vested with the JDA it could be only on 19.11.1991 on its declaration as State Land. State has also not handed over it to the JDA. JDA also never took possession of this land and no such record has been shown to the Court. It is surprising as to how the meeting by the Land and Property Committee, could take place on 20.06.1991 and how the allotment of the land was made to the Police on 30.07.1991 and 20.08.1991. The JDA could allot the land only when the land belongs to the JDA free from encumbrances. On the date of allotment of the land it was not declared as State Land. The appellants have made out their possession as the Trust is running a huge Educational Trust over the land and the tenants of the SMS have attorned in favour of the SMS. The action of the JDA and the State of allotment of land is unjustified, arbitrary, illegal and highly deplorable. A citizen has the right to protect his property and can be taken by the State only in accordance with law. JDA allotted this land to the Police who entered with arms on spot and made the appellants to seek shelter and protection of their rights by approaching the Court though prior to the declaration of land as State Land it was not available with the JDA for its allotment. The land in law could not have been allotted before 19.11.1991 when it was rightly or wrongly not declared as State Land. Any order passed prior to that for allotment of the land does not stand the test of law and is arbitrary action of the State/JDA. Thus, the orders of allotment are declared bad in law being arbitrary and illegal.”
21. We have closely perused the order passed by the Collector dated 17.04.1976. The subject land was deleted from the operation of the 1963 Act precisely for the reason that the ex-Maharaja had sold the said land to the respondent – SMS Corporation. However, the said order was not assailed by the State Government either by way of appeal or revision, as the case may be. The said order therefore attained finality.
22. It is also necessary to observe that, being aggrieved by the portions of the said order, the ex ruler filed the Writ Petitions against the Collector’s order which set aside portions of the order of the Collector by which he was aggrieved upon.
23. When the matter stood thus, we fail to understand as to how the Tahsildar could have initiated proceedings under the provisions of the Tenancy Act particularly with reference to Sections 63(7) and 63(4) on the premise that the possession of the land in question was not with the SMS Corporation and the said possession of the land vested with the State and thereafter with the appellant-JDA.
24. The initiation of these proceedings and the order dated 19.11.1991 by the Tahsildar is not in accordance with law or on facts. The said order ignores the fact that under the sale deed dated 19.11.1991 possession of the subject land was handed over by the ex-Maharaja to the vendee-purchaser, namely, the SMS Corporation. Therefore, the very initiation of the proceedings by the Tahsildar by his order dated 19.11.1991 was without jurisdiction and contrary to the facts as well as law.
25. In the circumstances, the High Court was justified in holding that this land could not have vested with the appellant-JDA and hence directed that any allotment made by appellant-JDA was also not in accordance with law and therefore, further directed that the vacant possession of the land must be handed over to the appellants before the High Court namely the respondents herein and consequential direction for correction of the revenue entries.
26. We do not find any reason to interfere with the said judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. Hence, the appeals are dismissed.
27. At this stage, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India submitted that 81 Bighas of the subject land was allotted to the Central Reserve Police Force (for short, “CRPF”) and therefore, she submitted that if the order of the High Court as sustained by this Court should be implemented then some direction may be issued for the purpose of vacating the land and alternative land may be allotted to the CRPF.
It is also stated by learned AAG appearing for the State that some portions of the subject land are also with the Rajasthan State Police.
28. In the circumstances, we direct the State to make alternative arrangements insofar as the police department and CRPF are concerned and vacate and hand over the possession of the extent of the land under the said entities to the respondent within a period of one year from today.
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 15528 – 15531 OF 2017:
29. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the observations made by the High Court vis-avis the appellants herein are adverse and without the appellants herein being parties to the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court.
30. We find substance in the said argument.
In the circumstances, we dispose of the said appeals by reserving liberty to the appellants herein to seek remedies available in law without being influenced by any of the observations made by the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned order.
We say so for the reason the said observations have been made against the appellants herein without the appellants herein being made parties to the Writ Appeals before the High Court. Hence, the aforesaid liberty.
The appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s). 3876/2017
Jaipur Development Authority.….Appellant(s)
Versus
Jamea Hidayat Trust and Ors.….Respondent(s)
WITH
C.A. NO. 3871/2017 (XV)
FOR EARLY HEARING APPLICATION ON IA 69791/2021
FOR PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES ON IA 130236/2021
FOR EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T. ON IA 130238/2021
FOR IMPLEADING PARTY ON IA 19865/2022
FOR INTERVENTION/IMPLEADMENT ON IA 19865/2022
FOR INTERVENTION APPLICATION ON IA 24815/2025
FOR EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T. ON IA 36717/2025
IA NO. 69791/2021 – EARLY HEARING APPLICATION
IA NO. 36717/2025 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
IA NO. 130238/2021 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
IA NO. 24815/2025 – INTERVENTION APPLICATION
IA NO. 19865/2022 – INTERVENTION/IMPLEADMENT
IA NO. 130236/2021 – PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES
C.A. NO. 3874/2017 (XV)
C.A. NO. 3872/2017 (XV)
C.A. NO. 3873/2017 (XV)
C.A. NO. 3875/2017 (XV)
C.A. NO. 3882/2017 (XV)
C.A. NO. 3883/2017 (XV)
C.A. NO. 3877/2017 (XV)
C.A. NO. 3881/2017 (XV)
C.A. NO. 3878/2017 (XV)
C.A. NO. 3880/2017 (XV)
C.A. NO. 15528-15531/2017 (XV)
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
ORDER
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).3876/2017: 3871/2017: 3874/2017: 3872/2017: 3873/2017: 3875/2017: 3882/2017: 3883/2017: 3877/2017: 3881/2017: 3878/2017: 3880/2017:
Appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed non-reportable judgment, which is placed on file.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 15528-15531/2017:
Appeals are disposed of in terms of the signed non-reportable judgment, which is placed on file.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
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