(Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.)
Director, Directorate of School Education ________________ Appellant;
v.
V. Ranganathan __________________________________ Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 9246 of 2019 (@ SLP (Civil) No 12908 of 2019), decided on December 6, 2019
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.:—
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 24 August 2018. The High Court allowed the writ petition instituted by the respondent under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal and allowed an alteration in the date of birth of the respondent from 17 August 1958 to 18 September 1959 in the service records together with all consequential benefits.
3. The respondent was initially appointed as a post-graduate Teacher in Kamban Government Higher Secondary School, Nettapakkam, Puducherry on 18 July 1988. His date of birth in the service book was entered as 17 August 1958 on the basis of the Secondary School Leaving Certificate. Consequently, the date on which the respondent was to attain superannuation was 31 August 2018. On 1 February 2017, the respondent was posted as Chief Education Officer, Puducherry. On 11 October 2017, the respondent submitted a representation for the correction of his date of birth from 17 August 1958 to 18 September 1959. The representation was rejected on 3 November 2017 following which the respondent moved the Central Administrative Tribunal.
4. The case of the respondent was that he had taken steps earlier to seek a correction in his date of birth by submitting representations on 21 August 1989, 11 April 1991 and 11 May 1995. In response to the OA before the Tribunal, a counter affidavit was filed by the Directorate of School Education stating that the alleged representations dated 21 August 1989 and 11 April 1991 were not authentic and in any event they were not addressed to the competent authority.
5. The Tribunal dismissed the OA by its judgment dated 2 August 2018, holding that there was no reason for the respondent to submit a plea belatedly on 11 October 2017 for a change in his date of birth in the service records. The Tribunal noted that the service records had been shown to the respondent in 1997 and there was no evidence of his having pursued the matter until November 2017 when he was due to superannuate on 31 August 2018. This view of the Tribunal was reversed by the High Court.
6. Before the High Court it appears that counsel appearing on behalf of the Directorate of Education submitted that the representation dated 21 August 1989 had been received but the High Court was informed that there was no record to show that the subsequent representations of 11 April 1991 and 11 May 1995 were submitted. The High Court came to the conclusion that the respondent had been pursuing the claim for an alteration of his date of birth in the service record right from 21 August 1989 and could not be blamed for the inaction on the part of the Directorate of Education. Hence, according to the High Court, this was not a case where the respondent had agitated a claim for a change in the date of birth towards the end of his career. Hence the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Harmam Singh1 was distinguished. The High Court, in consequence, set aside the judgment of the Tribunal and allowed the claim of the respondent with consequential benefits. As a result of the judgment of the High Court, the respondent continued to remain in service on the post with his date of birth being 18 September 1959 instead of 17 August 1958. The judgment of the High Court has been contested by the State. It has been urged that even before the Tribunal, it was the specific objection of the appellant that the representation allegedly submitted on 21 August 1989 was not authentic.
7. Mr. R. Venkatramani, learned Senior Counsel has placed on record a compilation of documents indicating that on 27 September 2019 the respondent has been placed under suspension in pursuance of an order of the Chief Vigilance Officer in the Government of Puducherry. A First Information Report has also been lodged against the respondent on the ground that he had tampered with the service records. Mr. Venkatramani urged that the representation alleged to have been submitted is fabricated. This is evident from the fact that the purpoted representation dated 21 August 1989 shows a seal which contains the word “Puduchery” though it was only in 2006 that the name of the Union Territory of Pondichery came to be altered to “Puducherry”. Be that as it may, it has also been urged that there was no reason or justification for the respondent to move the Tribunal in 2017 just a year before the date of his retirement.
8. On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the respondent by Mr. A. Sirajudeen, learned Senior Counsel that the respondent is ready and willing to face the inquiry which has been initiated by the State and to face the criminal proceedings. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the respondent moved the Tribunal after the rejection of his representation dated 3 November 2017 and therefore there was no delay on his part. Finally, it was submitted that since the respondent had been pursuing his claim since 1989, the High Court was justified in taking the view that there was no delay on his part.
9. The issue as to whether the respondent had in fact submitted a representation for an alteration of his date of birth on 21 August 1989 is seriously in contest. As we have noted, the appellant has placed the respondent under suspension in anticipation of a disciplinary inquiry and a First Information Report has been lodged. But the most significant aspect of the case is that even if such a representation has been submitted in August 1989 and was followed by reminders in April 1991 and May 1995 as the respondent claims, there was absolutely no justification for him not to pursue his legal remedies at an appropriate point of time. Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules as amended on 13 November 1979, provides as follows:
“The date on which a Government servant attains the age of 58 years or 60 years, as the case may be, shall be determined with reference to the date of birth declared by the Government servant to the time of appointment and accepted by the appropriate authority on production, as far as possible of confirmatory documentary evidence such as High School or Higher Secondary or Secondary School Certificate or an extract from Birth Register. The date of birth so declared by the Government servant and accepted by the appropriate authority shall not be subjected to any alteration except as specified in the note. An alteration of date of birth of a Government servant can be made, with the sanction of Ministry or Department of the Central Government or the Controller and Auditor General in regard to the persons serving in the India Audit and Accounts Department or an Administrator of a Union Territory under which the Government servants are serving, if-
(a) a request in this regard is made within 5 years of his entry into Government service.
(b) It is clearly established that a genuine bonafide mistake had occurred; and
(c) the date of birth so altered would not make him ineligible to appear in any school or University or Union Public Service examination in which he had appeared, or for entry into Government service on the date on which he first appeared at such examination or on the date on which he entered Government service.”
10. In view of the above provision, a request for a correction in the date of birth had to be made within a period of five years of the entry into service. The request for a change in the date of birth in the service records was made virtually at the end of the career of the respondent. Even if a representation had been submitted on 11 August 1989, it was only in 2017 that the respondent moved the Tribunal. There was no cause or justification for the delay and was reason enough to reject the OA. Therefore, the Tribunal was correct in coming to the conclusion that the OA had to be dismissed on the ground of delay. The High Court erred in interfering with the judgment of the Tribunal. The High Court has proceeded in a manner contrary to settled principles noted in several decisions of this Court including the decision in Harnam Singh (supra) which was drawn to its attention.
11. Since an FIR has been lodged by the appellant and disciplinary proceedings are to be initiated, we have not expressed any view either on the merits of the FIR or for that matter in regard to the disciplinary proceedings. The manner in which the extended service of one year which was rendered by the respondent pursuant to the order of the High Court is to be treated shall be dealt with by the competent authority at the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings.
12. For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the High Court was in error in setting aside the decision of the Tribunal. We allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 24 August 2018. No costs.
The Director Directorate of School Education _____________ Petitioner
v.
V. Ranganathan ____________________________________ Respondent
(IA No. 87067/2019-VACATING STAY)
Date : 06-12-2019 This matter was called on for hearing today.
(Before Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.)
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Venkataramani, Sr. Adv.
Mr. V.G. Pragasam, Adv.
Mr. S. Prabu Ramasubramanian, Adv.
Mr. S. Manuraj, Adv.
Mr. Yashraj Singh Bundela, Adv.
Mr. Praveen Vignesh, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. A. Sirajudeen, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Karri Venkata Reddy, Adv.
Ms. Astha Tyagi, AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
ORDER
13. Leave granted.
14. The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.
15. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
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1 (1993) 2 SCC 162
