(Ranjan Gogoi, C.J. and L. Nageswara Rao and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.)
Subhash Chandra (D) Thr. Lrs. __________________ Appellant(s)
v.
Gulab Bai & Ors. ___________________________ Respondent(s)
Civil Appeal No(s). 1696/2016, decided on January 22, 2019
With
Civil Appeal No. 1697 of 2016
The Order of the court was delivered by
Order
1. Applications for substitution of deceased appellant are allowed subject to all just exceptions by condoning the delay.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1696 OF 2016
2. The appellants are the legal heirs of deceased Subash Chandra (the landlord) who died during the pendency of the appeal before this court.
3. The landlord obtained an order of eviction of his tenant under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) by taking recourse to the special procedure contemplated under Chapter IIIA of the Act.
4. Calling into question the entitlement of the landlord to avail of the special procedure under Chapter IIIA of the Act on the ground that he is not a landlord within the meaning of the said expression as appearing in Section 23-J(ii) of the Act, a revision petition was filed before the High Court. The said revision led to a reference to a Full Bench of the High court. Two learned Judges of the High Court held that the appellant would not be a landlord within the meaning of Section 23-J(ii) of the Act. Aggrieved, the present appeal has been filed wherein two Judges Bench of this Court had referred the following questions for an authoritative pronouncement:
(i) Whether the expansion of the word ‘company’ to statutory Corporations by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ranjit Narayan Haksar v. Surendra Verma1 has to be understood to be confined only to Corporations engaged in trading activities and statutory Corporations including Municipal Corporations would be outside the scope of the said expression “company” appearing in Section 23-J(ii) of the Act.
(ii) If the answer to the above question is in the negative, whether the expression “company owned and controlled either by the Central or State Government” appearing in Section 23-J(ii) of the Act would require an expansive and liberal interpretation to save the said provision from being declared to be unconstitutional on the touch-stone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
5. We have noticed the special procedure and the special forum available for the categories of landlords specified in Section 23-J of the Act. They include: retired Government servants; retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central or State Government; a widow or a divorced wife; physically handicapped person; a retired member of the defence service. The object of creating a special procedure and special forum by incorporating Chapter IIIA in the Act is to provide a more efficacious and speedy remedy to a category of landlords to obtain speedy possession of the premises which he/she/they may have let out. The special category of landlords envisaged under Section 23-J of the Act are persons who have either retired from Government service or defence service or company owned or controlled either by the Central or State Government or such persons who suffer from some kind of disadvantages like a physically handicapped person or a widow or divorced wife. The Madhya Pradesh High Court itself had expanded the meaning of the term ‘company’ appearing in Section 23-J(ii) of the Act by including within the ambit of the said expression the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation. The said order of the Madhya Pradesh High has been affirmed by this Court by dismissing the Special Leave Petition against the said order.
6. If the object of Chapter IIIA of the Act is to provide a speedy remedy and a special forum for a category of persons who have retired from service we do not see how the retired employees of a Municipal Corporation can be legitimately excluded from the provisions of Section 23-J(ii) of the Act. Doing so would be putting Section 23-J of the Act itself to jeopardy. The object of the Act being what has been noticed above, the classification of retired persons by inclusion of one class i.e. Government service etc. and exclusion of another i.e. of Municipal Corporation, in our considered view, would render the provisions of Section 23-J(ii) constitutionally fragile.
7. We, therefore, are of the view that reading the provisions of Section 23-J(ii) of the Act to include retired employees of the Municipal Corporation would further the object behind the enactment of Chapter IIIA of the Act. We, therefore, hold that the appellant – landlord was fully entitled to avail of the special procedure enjoined by Chapter IIIA of the Act and the decree of eviction obtained by him cannot be faulted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal/Forum which had decided the matter.
8. Having held as above we now remit the matter back to the High Court for a decision on the Civil Revision Application on merits on such contentions that may be advanced. In view of the age of the litigation we request the High Court to decide the matter as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the present order.
9. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms by answering the question referred in the manner indicated above.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1697 OF 2016
10. In terms of the order of this Court passed today i.e. 22nd January, 2019 in civil Appeal No. 1696 of 2016, the order of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1696/2016
Subhash Chandra (D) Thr. Lrs __________________________ Appellant
v.
Gulab Bai & Ors _________________________________ Respondent(s)
I.A. NO. 171682/2018 – APPLICATION FOR SUBSTITUTION
I.A. NO. 171683/2018 – CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING SUBSTITUTION APPLN.
WITH
C.A. NO. 1697/2016 (IV-A)
I.A. NO. 171690/2018 – APPLICATION FOR SUBSTITUTION
I.A. NO. 171692/2018 – CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING SUBSTITUTION APPLN.
Date : 22-01-2019 These matters were called on for hearing today.
(Before Ranjan Gogoi, C.J. and L. Nageswara Rao and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.)
Mr. S.K. Dubey, Sr. Adv. (A/C) [N/P]
For Appellant(s) Mr. Subhash Samvatsar, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Nitin S. Tambwekar, Adv.
Mr. Seshatalpa Sai Bandaru, AOR For Respondent(s)
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
ORDER
11. Applications for substitution are allowed subject to all just exceptions by condoning the delay.
12. The appeals are disposed in terms of the signed order.
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1. 1995 MPLJ 21
