(Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Manoj Misra, JJ.)
S.N. Jagannath Rao Since Deceased by His Lrs. _______ Petitioner(s);
v.
T. Velliyamma Since Deceased by Her Lrs. __________ Respondent(s).
Civil Appeal No. 3572 of 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 2589/2024), decided on March 19, 2026
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Manoj Misra, J.:—
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal impugns the judgment and order of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru1 dated 11.10.2023 passed in Regular First Appeal No. 358/2009, whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant(s) and thereby affirmed the judgment and decree dated 15.01.2009 passed by the Trial Court (i.e., XIV Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore) in Original Suit No. 5944/1996.
3. Jagannath Rao (predecessor-in-interest of the appellants) (since deceased) (hereinafter referred to as the original plaintiff) instituted Suit No. 3643/1990 against T. Velliyamma (since deceased) (predecessor-in-interest of the respondents) (hereinafter referred to as the original defendant) for permanent prohibitory injunction in respect of a piece of land.
4. Initially, the aforesaid suit was decreed by the trial court against which the defendant preferred regular appeal no. 306/1991 before the High Court. The High Court, vide judgment dated 18.11.1994, set aside the Trial Court decree and left it open for the parties to institute such proceedings as may be advised for declaration of their right and title.
5. Pursuant to the aforesaid liberty, the original plaintiff instituted original suit no. 5944/1996 on 23.08.1996 for declaration of title and possession.
6. The case set up by the original plaintiff in the subsequent suit was that the suit property was previously owned by Nanjappa and his son Kempaiah, which was purchased by the plaintiff vide sale deed dated 27.11.1989; whereas the defendant is just a trespasser.
7. In response to the plaint averments, the original defendant contested the suit on multiple grounds. Firstly, that the suit was barred by limitation as title of the plaintiff was denied in the previous round of litigation. Secondly, suit property is a portion of Survey No. 19/2 of Matadahalli village, which was acquired by the City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore (for short, the Improvement Trust) in the year 1974. Later, it came to Bangalore Development Authority (for short, BDA) as successor of the Improvement Trust. BDA delivered possession to the defendant in 1981. It was claimed that since then the defendant had been in possession therefore, the suit for possession was also barred by limitation. Thirdly, plaintiff’s vendors i.e., Nanjappa and Kempaiah had purchased the property from Chunchappa under registered sale deed dated 15.12.1975. Prior to that, the Improvement Trust had published a preliminary notification on 09.02.1970 to acquire the entire land in Survey No. 19/2 and final notification was published on 25.06.1974. Thus, sale deed in favour of Nanjappa and his son Kempaiah being executed on 15.12.1975, that is after publication of acquisition notification, no title passed under the sale deed. Hence, the said sale deed is nothing but void. Fourthly, BDA, the successor in interest of the Improvement Trust, had executed a lease cum sale agreement in favour of the defendant and had also issued possession certificate on 08.06.1981. Later, BDA executed a sale deed in favour of the defendant on 22.02.1992. Thus, plaintiff is neither owner nor in possession of the suit property, which was earlier acquired and, later, transferred to the defendant who is in possession thereof.
8. Trial court framed and decided multiple issues2. Issues 1, 3 and 5 were decided in the affirmative. Issues 2 and 4 were decided in the negative. On issue No. 5, it was held that only 38 Guntas were acquired. Based on its decision on issue No. 2, the suit was dismissed. The relevant portions of the trial court judgment are extracted below:
“11. … From the documents produced, it becomes clear that the suit schedule property boundary tallies with sale deed Ex. P-1 and sale deed Ex.P-10.
17. …It goes to show that Chunchappa in the sale deed executed by him has mentioned Sy. No. 19/2 instead of Sy. No. 19/2A and sold sites to various persons including Bommamma. From this award, it becomes clear that before Chunchappa sold Site No. 35 to Bommamma on 15.12.1975, the suit schedule property i.e. Site No. 35 was proposed for schedule acquisition. Preliminary notification and final notifications were published in the gazette and later, on 11.11.1977 the award has been passed. It is evident from the award Ex. D-46. Therefore, this Ex. P-10 has not conferred valid title over the suit schedule property on Bommamma. Therefore, legal representatives of Bommamma i.e. Nanjappa and his son Kempaiah have no right to sell the suit schedule property to the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff has not acquired the valid right over the suit schedule property. ….
18. …It is already held that entire extent of Sy. No. 19/2 was proposed for acquisition, but only 38 Guntas of the land has been acquired. Issue no. 6 answered accordingly.”
9. Aggrieved by dismissal of its suit, the original plaintiff filed a regular first appeal before the High Court. One of the submissions advanced before the High Court was that the Trial Court had wrongly applied Article 58 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 to hold that the suit was barred by limitation because, here, Article 65, which provides limitation of 12 years, was applicable since the suit was also for possession, based on title.
10. The above argument did not find favour with the High Court as the defendant in the earlier suit had set up title in himself and had denied the title of the plaintiff. Therefore, according to the High Court, declaratory relief was essential, and the period of limitation for seeking declaration is three years, which had passed. In addition, the High Court found the issue immaterial as the plaintiff had failed to prove its title. Based on above, the appeal was dismissed.
11. Aggrieved by dismissal of his appeal, the appellant is before us.
12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner had submitted that this is a clear case where the period of limitation ought to have been computed as per Article 65 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 and not Article 58 because the plaintiff had sought possession and declaration was just an ancillary relief. It was argued that the first suit was dismissed because it was for injunction when the plaintiff was out of possession. However, since the defendant had entered possession within 12 years from the date of institution of the second suit, the second suit based on title was within limitation and it ought to have been decreed.
14. Per contra, it was submitted by counsel for respondent that the Trial Court had found plaintiff’s predecessor-in- interest having no title in the suit property. This finding was affirmed by the first appellate court, and no serious challenge has been laid to the said finding. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim is based on a void sale deed in respect of a land already acquired. In such circumstances, when BDA had transferred interest in the suit property to the original defendant, there was no question of decreeing suit for possession. Thus, the question of limitation is of no relevance. As a result, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
15. We have accorded due consideration to the rival contentions and have perused the materials on record.
16. On the question of limitation, this Court recently in N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board3 held that in a suit where possession is sought based on title, main relief would be possession and declaration of title would be ancillary, therefore, the period of limitation would be 12 years from the date the possession of the defendant becomes adverse in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Similar is the view taken by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood4. Therefore, in our view, the suit of the appellant could not have been held barred by limitation by applying Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
17. However, even if the question of limitation is decided in favour of the appellant, it would be inconsequential as the two courts below have concurrently found that the suit property was part of the property acquired by the Improvement Trust (i.e., the predecessor-in-interest of BDA), therefore sale deed in favour of plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest was void and the plaintiff derived no title. We find that trial court’s finding in that regard is based on thorough consideration of the evidence on record. Further, the first appellate court has affirmed the said finding in paragraphs 25 and 26 of its judgment. This finding is based on appreciation of evidence and cannot be considered perverse. Moreover, there is no serious challenge laid to the said finding. In such circumstances, we do not find any good reason to interfere with the said finding.
18. As it is well settled that no one can confer better title than what one has in the property, the appellant cannot derive any advantage on reversal of the finding qua limitation. Therefore, once it is found that plaintiff has failed to prove his title, he cannot seek possession in a suit based on title.
19. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The same is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending application (s), if any, shall stand disposed of. There is no order as to costs.
———
1 The High Court
2 Issues Framed by Trial Court:
1. Whether the description of the suit property is correct?
2. Whether the plaintiff could prove his title to the plaint schedule property?
3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
4. Whether the suit is hit by Order II Rule 2 CPC?
5. Whether the suit property was carved out of Sy. No. 19/2 of Matadahalli village?
6. Whether the entire Sy. No. 19/2 was acquired by then CITB Bangalore vide preliminary notification dated 09.12.1970 and final notification dated 25.06.1974?
7. What relief/reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to?
3 (2024) 19 SCC 121, paragraphs 26, 27 and 28
4 (2019) 7 SCC 76
