(B.V. Nagarathna and Augustine George Masih, JJ.)
Narendirakumar and Others ______________________ Appellant(s);
v.
State Represented by the Sho and Another ___________ Respondent(s).
Criminal Appeal No. of 2024 (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1113/2024), decided on May 15, 2024
The Order of the court was delivered by
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal challenges the order dated 04.01.2023 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Crl.R.C. No. 269 of 2020.
3. The Appellant No. 1 was convicted vide order dated 20.12.2018 by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Puducherry in CC No. 17/2018 under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and was sentenced to one-year rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine of Rs. 1,000. Additionally, the said appellant was convicted under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (“Dowry Act”) and sentenced to one-year rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, and in default, additional imprisonment of one month respectively.
4. Appellant No. 2 was convicted under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and was sentenced to one-year rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-.
5. Further, Appellant No. 2 was convicted under Section 506 of the IPC and sentenced to one-year rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. Additionally, appellant No. 2 was convicted under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (“Dowry Act”) and sentenced to one-year rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, and in default, additional imprisonment of one month respectively.
6. Appellant No. 3 was convicted under Section 498-A of the IPC and was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, and in default, additional imprisonment of one month respectively. Further, Appellant No. 3 was convicted under Section 4 of the Dowry Act and was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, and in default, additional imprisonment of one month.
7. Being aggrieved by the orders passed by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Puducherry dated 20.12.2018, the appellants approached the Court of II Additional Sessions Judge, Puducherry by filing Crl. Appeal No. 1 of 2019 wherein the II Additional Sessions Court vide order dated 29.01.2020 partially modified the orders passed by the Trial Court. The Additional Sessions Court confirmed the conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court in respect of all the appellants except for acquitting Appellant No. 2 under Section 506 IPC.
8. Being aggrieved by the order of the Sessions Court, Puducherry dated 29.01.2020, the appellants approached the High Court of Judicature at Madras by filing a Criminal Revision in Crl. R.C. No. 269 of 2020. Vide the impugned order dated 04.01.2023, the High Court dismissed the criminal revision petition filed by the appellants and confirmed the conviction and punishment imposed by the Sessions Court. Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 29.01.2020, the appellants preferred the instant SLP (Crl.). No. 1113 of 2024 and this Court issued notice vide order dated 22.01.2024.
9. We have heard learned Advocate in support of the appellants and learned Advocate for the respondent(s) and perused the counter affidavit filed by the respondent(s).
10. Learned counsel for the appellant(s) submitted that the appellants are presently in jail. However, they have sought for quashing of the criminal proceedings initiated as against them despite presently undergoing sentence. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the appellant(s) placed reliance on the following judgments of this Court –
1. Arvind Barsaul (Dr.) v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 5 SCC 794
2. Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303
3. Jitendra Raghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi (2013) 4 SCC 58
11. He submitted that the offences alleged against the appellants herein were essentially under Section 498-A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Act; that these offences are not heinous offences as such which can be categorised as offences against the society. He further submitted that in view of the parties being divorced and they are leading their separate lives it is a good case where this Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants herein and consequently direct that the appellants be released from jail.
12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent(s) submitted that this is a clear case where the appellants have been convicted of the offences alleged against them and they are also in custody and at this stage it may not be just and proper for the appellants to seek their release when there is already a conviction as against them. Learned counsel, however, submitted that this Court may, having regard to earlier precedents, pass an appropriate order in the matter.
13. Learned counsel for the complainant, however, submitted that the complainant and her husband have divorced and are leading their separate lives; that both the parties have re-married and, therefore, the complainant may not be interested in ensuring that the appellants herein complete their sentence as such. In this regard, learned counsel for the complainant/respondent no. 2 also drew our attention to the affidavit filed by her on 09.10.2023 to the effect that the marriage between her and her husband has been dissolved vide judgment and decree dated 17.10.2014 passed by the Family Court at Puducherry in MOP No. 97/2014 and that she has married; that due to passage of time, the bitterness between her and her former husband has dissolved and she has no objection for compounding the offence passed by the learned Iind Additional Sessions Judge at Puducherry in Criminal Appeal No. 1/2019 imposed on the appellants herein. He further submitted that even if there is no compounding of the offences and sentence, nevertheless, this Court in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India may pass an appropriate order in the matter. In this regard, he drew our attention to a three Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Prdesh (2022) 13 SCC 635.
14. We have considered the arguments advanced at the Bar and perused the material on record particularly the affidavit filed by the second respondent/complainant and the judgments cited at the Bar.
15. This Court in the case of Arvind Barsaul (supra) noted that criminal complaints were filed by respondent 2 wife against the appellants viz, her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law as a counterblast to the divorce petition filed by the appellant husband. Subsequently, decree of divorce by mutual consent was granted by the Civil Judge. But the appellants were convicted under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment and fine of Rs. 100 each with default stipulation. During pendency of the appeal, the parties sorted out their differences and filed petitions for compromise in the criminal proceedings. The appellate court rejected the compromise on the ground that offence under Section 498-A IPC could not be compromised. The appellants filed petitions under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the criminal proceedings but the High Court declined to interfere. In the appeal before the Supreme Court, Respondent No. 2 submitted that she was not interested in prosecuting the appellants. Disposing of the appeal, this Court held that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice, continuation of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law. In exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court deemed it proper to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the appellants emanating from the FIR lodged under Section 498-A IPC.
16. In Jitendra Raghuvanshi (supra), a three Judge Bench of this Court took note of the fact that there were matrimonial disputes between the parties therein resulting in filing of complaints under Sections 498-A and 406 of the IPC. However, there was a mutual settlement and the complainant had also sworn to an affidavit supporting the stand of the appellants therein. However, the High Court noted that despite there being a mutual settlement arrived at between the parties but related to a non-compoundable offence, it could not be compounded and dismissed the petition under Section 482. Actually, the application filed by the applicants therein before the High Court was not for compounding of the non-compoundable offences but for the purpose of quashing the criminal proceedings.
17. This Court in paragraph 15 observed as under:—
“15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings.”
18. Consequently, the order of the High Court was set aside and relief was granted to the parties therein.
19. The correctness of the judgments of this Court in B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana (2003) 4 SCC 675; Nikhil Merchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2008) 9 SCC 677; and Manoj Sharma v. State (2008) 16 SCC 1. came up for consideration before a three-Judge Bench in the case of Gian Singh (supra). In paragraphs 61 and 62 of the said judgment, this Court observed as under:—
“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil favour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.
62. In view of the above, it cannot be said that B.S. Joshi1, Nikhil Merchant and Manoj Sharma were not correctly decided. We answer the reference accordingly. Let these matters be now listed before the concerned Bench(es) concerned.”
20. Recently, in Ramawatar (supra) another three Judge Bench of this Court, while exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India quashed the criminal proceedings to do complete justice between the parties. Consequently, the judgment and orders passed by the Trial Court and the High Court were set aside having regard to the fact that the victim/complainant had willingly entered into compromise/settlement with the accused and the criminal proceedings involved non-heinous offences or offences which were predominantly of a private nature.
21. This Court enumerated some of the relevant consideration for exercising such powers as illustrative and non-exhaustive, namely, (i) nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of society, (ii) seriousness of the injury, if any, (iii) voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim, and (iv) conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations for the purpose of exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India noting that in post-conviction matters it is not permissible to compound a non-compoundable offence under Section 320 of the CrPC unless an appeal is pending before on or the other judicial forum. It was observed that where a settlement is arrived at post the attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the basis of compromise would be impermissible; that even exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, though of a constitutional nature, nevertheless cannot directly be in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing directly with the subject. In the circumstances, after analysing the cases, this Court found it appropriate to exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and quashed the criminal proceedings to do complete justice between the parties. As a sequel thereto, the judgment and order passed by the Trial Court and the High Court were set aside and the appeal was allowed. It was observed that while considering the prayer for quashing on the basis of the compromise or settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 in the said case would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C.
22. Following the aforesaid judgments and in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we quash the complaints and the consequent proceedings initiated against the appellants herein on the basis of the settlement arrived at between the parties and on the basis of the affidavit filed by respondent no. 2 before this Court.
23. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgments and orders are set-aside. The appellants are directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
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